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BEYOND THE REACH OF STATES: THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE, EXTRATERRITORIAL STATE
REGULATION, AND THE CONCERNS OF
FEDERALISM
I. INTRODUCTION
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he
Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 1 Interpreting this explicit
grant of power to Congress, the Supreme Court has long recognized the existence
of an implied limitation on the power of a state to legislate in areas of interstate
commerce when Congress has remained silent.2 Under what is referred to as the
negative or "dormant" Commerce Clause,3 the federal courts have thus scruti-
nized state legislation for well over one hundred years.
In the past several decades, countless articles and numerous concurring and
dissenting opinions have addressed the issues involved with the use of the Com-
merce Clause to strike down state legislation. Like many of those materials, this
Comment generally disagrees with an expansive use of the Commerce Clause as a
vehicle to invalidate state legislation. Unfortunately, the abundance of criticism of
the United States Supreme Court's current approach to restraining state legislation
has yielded no solution to the mounting problems faced by state legislatures, law
students, counselors, and those on the bench in discerning any sense of modem
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In fact, the courts have recently struck
out at state legislation to a greater degree by adding the extraterritoriality principle
to the dormant Commerce Clause analysis. Under this principle, a variety of state
regulations dealing with waste disposal, 4 college athletics, 5 price affirmation,6 ten-
der offers, 7 and the Internet8 have been invalidated on the grounds that the regula-
tions had effects beyond the borders of the enacting state. The rationale for the
decisions of the federal courts in this regard is not clear.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has broadly defined the
term "commerce." In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), for example, Chief Justice
Marshall stated that "[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is inter-
course." Id. at 189 (emphasis added). By this, he meant that commerce "describes the commer-
cial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations .... in all its branches, and is regulated by
prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse." Id. at 189-90; see generally Randy E. Barnett,
The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101,146 (2001) (reviewing
the historical definitions of "commerce" and concluding that the term "means the trade or ex-
change of goods (including the means of transporting them)").
2. E.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
3. The term "dormant" has been used to connote the fact that Congress has not acted. Julian
N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L. J. 425, 425 n.1 (1982).
Although the terms "negative" and "dormant" may be, and have been, used interchangeably, this
Comment will use only the latter in the interest of consistency.
4. Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 659-60 (7th Cir. 1995).
5. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1993).
6. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337-39 (1989).
7. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982).
8. Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (invalidating a New
York statute governing the transmittal of obscene material to minors over the Internet).
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In light of the considerable federalism concerns involved with striking down
state legislation, it is imperative that the courts and the legal community under-
stand the implications of such a methodology. Consequently, this Comment will
begin by examining the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in detail. It will
review the historical underpinnings of the dormant Commerce Clause in an effort
to discover the underlying concerns of the federal courts concerning state legisla-
tion. This Comment will then examine not only the various facets of the modern
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, but also the many challenges to the cur-
rent methodology. Surveying the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence in this
manner will reveal that it is ailing and, more importantly, that it serves as a poor
host for the extraterritoriality principle.
After reviewing the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and exposing
the underlying concerns of the courts concerning state legislation that is either
discriminatory or protectionist in nature, this Comment will explore the extraterri-
toriality principle. It will review the Supreme Court cases decided in the 1980s,
which suggested that the federal courts should analyze the extraterritoriality prin-
ciple under the rubric of the dormant Commerce Clause. This Comment will then
expose the problems with such an approach by examining a number of lower fed-
eral court decisions considering state initiatives having extraterritorial effects.
The discussion section of this Comment will further address the problems
inherent with the use of the extraterritoriality principle under a dormant Com-
merce Clause framework. It will conclude that such an approach unduly endan-
gers state legislation, particularly in today's modern commercial environment.
Moreover, the discussion section will attempt to expound upon the underlying con-
cerns with extraterritorial state legislation. Finally, this Comment will briefly pro-
pose a more practical scheme for analyzing statutes with extraterritorial effects
that does not jeopardize the viability of innovative state legislation to the extent
that the current approach does.
The objectives of this Comment are not only to argue in favor of separating
the extraterritoriality principle from the dormant Commerce Clause, but also to
strike a delicate balance between ensuring that states act within their respective
spheres and allowing them the opportunity to respond to pressing social problems
with innovative legislative initiatives. Most importantly, however, this Comment
seeks to shed light on the extraterritoriality principle in order to achieve not only a
greater level of understanding, but also more predictable decisions. Difficult as
the task may be, it is imperative that the extraterritoriality principle be clarified,
for, as one commentator has expressed, "clarity is a virtue that cannot be valued
too much in constitutional law."9
U1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AS A VEHICLE TO
INVALIDATE STATE LEGISLATION
The Constitution does not explicitly provide that states are limited in their
capacity to legislate matters involving interstate commerce. 10 In the absence of
9. Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125, 150.
See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 (1897)
("[B]y ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain very much in the clearness
of our thought.").
10. The text of the Commerce Clause reads in part: "The Congress shall have [the] Power
.. [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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any clear assertion within the Commerce Clause for the notion that states are so
limited, the Court has looked to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution for
such support. 11 Unfortunately, this task has proved exceptionally difficult be-
cause those who were present at the Constitutional Convention spent very little
time explaining their specific intentions in drafting the Commerce Clause. The
Court, in H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond,12 noted this glaring omission and de-
fended the Framers on the ground that, at the time of the Constitutional Conven-
tion, the need for a clause ensuring free trade was "so obvious and so fully recog-
nized" that it hardly required exposition. 13 As a result, for more than a century, the
federal courts have inferred the Framers' intent by considering the events that made
the Convention necessary. 14 Specifically, the Court has looked to the turmoil un-
der the Articles of Confederation and the "tendencies toward economic
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies" to justify its reading
of an implied limitation on state power under the Commerce Clause. 15 Writing for
the Court in a 1949 decision, Justice Jackson described the interaction among the
new states during the era immediately following the American Revolution as fol-
lows:
[A] drift toward anarchy and commercial warfare between the states began. ...
each state would legislate according to its estimate of its own interests, the im-
portance of its own products, and the local advantages or disadvantages of its
position in a political or commercial view." This came "to threaten at once the
peace and safety of the Union." 16
Essentially, the states instituted trade barriers and regulations designed to protect
their own interests to the injury and disadvantage of those states and interests that
had no voice in the political processes of the enacting state.17
Arguably, the concern over the protective measures undertaken by the indi-
vidual state, coupled with the very convening of the Constitutional Convention to
rectify such state actions, provide the basis for the inference that the Framers in-
tended the Commerce Clause to be construed as a significant source of congres-
sional power. 18 Such a strong national power would enable Congress to regulate
11. See Baldwin v. G.A.E Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935) ("[A] chief occasion of the
commerce clauses was 'the mutual jealousies and aggressions of the States, taking form in cus-
toms barriers and other economic retaliation."') (citations omitted); see also H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532 (1949).
12. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
13. Id. at 534.
14. E.g., Eule, supra note 3, at 430.
15. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
16. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 533 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 259-60 (3d ed. 1858)).
17. DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 159-61 (1989).
18. See id. (noting that James Madison adamantly believed in a strong congressional regula-
tory power for the new republic); see also JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145-46
(2d ed. 1983), in which the authors state:
[History demonstrates] two general concerns for the drafting of the Constitution in
general and the commerce clause in particular: (1) the power must have been meant
to put an end, either in itself or through federal legislation, to the trade barriers and
tariffs which had led to the economic problems during the preceding period; (2) the
national power must have been intended to be broad enough to deal with the type of
economic problems of the nation as a unit.
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trade among the states in such a way as to ensure the solidarity of the new nation. 19
However, the drafters of the Constitution did not forget to provide the states with
their own innate powers. Indeed, the Tenth Amendment specifically provides that
"[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.' 20
This catch-all provision effectively ensures that the federal and state governments
will coexist, each within their own respective spheres. Beyond the powers specifi-
cally granted to Congress 2l and those specifically denied to the states, 2 2 the Con-
stitution does not define the exact rights of the states in our federal system. Conse-
quently, the judiciary has historically assumed the role of defining and limiting the
rights of the states. The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine exemplifies one mecha-
nism by which the judiciary has defined the powers of the states to regulate mat-
ters involving interstate trade and commercial activity.23
A. The Origins and Development of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
1. Traditional Historical Analysis
The concept that the Commerce Clause may contain within it a "silent" re-
striction on how far the states may go in regulating interstate commerce surfaced
in the early years of our country. As early as 1824, in the case of Gibbons v.
Ogden,24 Chief Justice Marshall implicitly identified the restrictions on a state's
ability to regulate commerce among the states in the absence of congressional
action. 25 In Gibbons, the Court found unconstitutional a New York law authoriz-
ing a ferry monopoly to operate between New York and New Jersey due to an
impermissible conflict with an act of Congress authorizing coastal vessels to navi-
gate the waters of the United States. 26 Although the Gibbons Court did not find it
necessary to decide to what extent a state may regulate commerce, it certainly
suggested that the several states have some ability to do so. Noting that the Con-
stitution specifically granted Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce
and remained silent as to the power of the states, the Chief Justice stated that the
very meaning of the phrase "to regulate" necessarily precludes a state from exer-
19. See NOWAK ET AL., supra note 18, at 161, 165; GARY C. LEEDS, THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 32-33 (1986).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
21. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
23. See Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43,43 (1988) ("Absent any congressional action, the Court has construed Congress' power to regu-
late commerce in its dormant state as an important limit on state regulation."); James E. Gaylord,
Note, State Regulatory Jurisdiction and the Internet: Letting the Dormant Commerce Clause
Lie, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1095, 1106 (1999) ("[T]he Supreme Court has found in the Commerce
Clause a fount of power for striking down state legislation which discriminates against or un-
duly interferes with interstate commerce.").
24. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
25. Id. at 209-10.
26. Id. at 239-40.
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cising its power concurrently with that of Congress. 27 Yet, Chief Justice Marshall
went on to mention in dicta that there might be instances where a state may regu-
late commerce. 28 Specifically, Marshall opined that states may enact laws so long
as such laws do not contradict or interfere with a validly enacted Congressional
statute.29
Chief Justice Marshall further refined the notion that the Commerce Clause
may contain a negative aspect just five years later in the case of Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co.30 In Willson, the State of Delaware passed an act authoriz-
ing the Black Bird Creek Marsh Company to build a dam on Black Bird Creek. 3 1
When Willson challenged the act on the ground that it authorized the building of a
dam that interfered with interstate navigation, the Court upheld the Delaware act
because it was not "repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant
state."'32 Marshall reasoned that because Delaware endeavored merely to protect
the health of those living near the marsh, the act fell squarely within the state's
province of regulation. 33 Thus, Willson can be read to support the proposition that
the states have some power to regulate matters of particular importance to their
citizens even though such regulations affect interstate commerce. Despite the
Court's early recognition of the negative implications of the Commerce Clause,
the Court did not embrace the doctrine until the mid to late nineteenth century.34
Early interpretations of the dormant Commerce Clause not only do away with
the notion that Congress alone may regulate under Article I, but also evidence a
concentration on distinguishing state legislation based on whether the subject of
the regulation is "national" or "local" in nature. To illustrate, the seminal case of
Cooley v. Board of Wardens35 recognized the right of states to regulate in areas
found to be "local and not national" in the absence of a congressional exertion of
power.36 Determining that a 1789 federal statute clearly authorized state regula-
27. Id. at 209. The Chief Justice wrote:
It has been contended... that, as the word "to regulate" implies in its nature, full
power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others
that would perform the same operation on the same thing .... There is great force in
this argument, and the court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.
Id.
28. Id. at 209-10.
29. Id.
30. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
31. Id. at 245-46.
32. Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
33. See id. at 251. Marshall stated that such matters are "are undoubtedly ... reserved to the
states." Id.
34. The legal community is in disagreement as to when the Court formally adopted the doc-
trine. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 209 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(noting that the doctrine was formally adopted in 1873 in Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 232 (1873)); Eule, supra note 3, at 425 n. 1 (1981) (recognizing The License Cases, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), as the cases of adoption); Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation is
Too Much-An Examination of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 47,47
n.1 (1981) (recognizing Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851), as the
case of formal adoption).
35. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). This case involved an 1803 Pennsylvania law requiring
boats entering the Philadelphia harbor to hire a "pilot" and a 1789 federal statute authorizing the
states to regulate guide services. Cooley failed to hire a guide in the harbor in violation of the
state regulation and was fined. Id. at 311-12.
36. Id. at 319.
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tion of pilot services in a port, the Cooley Court held that states may legislate in
areas of particularly local concern that do not require a single uniform rule.37
Focusing its analysis on the subjects of state legislation, the Court reasoned that,
although some subjects require a single uniform rule, others demand a "diversity,
which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation."'38 Conspicuously ab-
sent from the Court's opinion, however, was a suggested means of distinguishing
between subjects that are truly local and those that are national.39 At the turn of
the century, the Court replaced the Cooley test because of these difficulties and
because of the test's failure to consider a statute's purpose or effect.40 Despite the
inherent limitations of a local-national approach, the states' local interests as well
as the concern for uniformity continue to play significant roles in contemporary
dormant Commerce Clause cases. 4 1
Replacing the local-national scheme in the early part of the twentieth century
was another formalistic approach designed to take into account the effects of regu-
lation on interstate commerce. This new test analyzed individual cases in terms of
whether a regulation's effect either directly or indirectly impeded the flow of inter-
state commerce. 42 Employing the direct-indirect analysis, the Court examined
several state regulations during the first half of the century to determine whether
the effect of the legislation served as a direct burden upon interstate commerce,
and therefore exceeded the state's powers of regulation. For example, in Southern
Railway Co. v. King,4 3 the Court applied the direct-indirect analysis in upholding
a Georgia statute requiring railway engineers to blow the locomotive's whistle and
to slow at highway crossings. 4 4 Justice Day concluded that the petitioner failed to
37. Id. at 321. The majority's opinion in Cooley has been referred to as the "Cooley Compro-
mise." The decision avoided a political calamity in that it "simultaneously avoided confronta-
tion with states' rights advocates, yet reserved for the Court the ability to invalidate objection-
able state legislation under a theory of partial exclusivity." Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent,
The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J.
569, 579 (1987).
38. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319.
39. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 242 (14th ed. 2001).
40. Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed
Unitary Framework, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 395, 410 (1998).
41. Id. (Professor Lawrence writes that "[t]he Court's reasoning in Cooley endures, however,
in the sense that the resolution of a particular case today will turn in large part on a consideration
of the local (state) interest in regulating local affairs as it relates to the national interest in pro-
moting interstate commerce."); see, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamic Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88
(1987) (citing Cooley for the proposition that state statutes may be invalidated if they "adversely
affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations").
42. See, e.g., S. Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524, 531-32 (1910). The Court stated:
It has been frequently decided in this court that the right to regulate interstate com-
merce is, by virtue of the Federal Constitution, exclusively vested in the Congress of
the United States. The states cannot pass any law directly regulating such commerce.
Attempts to do so have been declared unconstitutional in many instances, and the
exclusive power in Congress to regulate such commerce uniformly maintained. While
this is true, the rights of the states to pass laws not having the effect to regulate or
directly interfere with the operations of interstate commerce, passed in the exercise of
the police power of the state in the interest of the public health and safety, have been
maintained by the decisions of this court.
Id.
43. 217 U.S. 524 (1910).
44. Id. at 531.
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establish that the Georgia initiative imposed a direct burden on interstate com-
merce. 45 Similarly, in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,46 the Court considered a 1921
Pennsylvania law requiring a license to sell passenger steamship tickets. 4 7 The act
also required each applicant for such a license to publish his application in several
publications, to prove his good moral character, and to post a $1000 security bond. 48
Although designed to prevent fraudulent conduct on the part of steamship agents,
the Court held that the act violated the Commerce Clause because it imposed a
direct burden on interstate commerce. 49 Over a vigorous dissent from Justices
Brandeis and Holmes, and a separate dissent filed by Justice Stone, the majority
suggested that a state may not directly interfere with interstate commerce even to
further a legitimate state interest. 50 The direct-indirect analysis also surfaced in
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Railroad Commission,5 1 where the
Court considered an order by the California state railroad commission requiring
interstate railroad companies to build a passenger station for the convenience of
passengers. 5 2 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Hughes determined that the
state's order would only create an incidental burden on the interstate railroad com-
panies.5 3 In any event, the Court found that the track relocation and financial
expense necessary to carry out the state's order did not "unnecessarily or arbi-
trarily trammel or interfere with the operation and conduct of railroad properties
and business." '54
Like the national-local test examined above, the direct-indirect analysis was
not without limitations. Unable to adopt a meaningful distinction between statutes
that burden interstate commerce directly and those that do so indirectly, the direct-
indirect scheme led to unpredictable and somewhat arbitrary decisions. 55 As a
result, the new test failed to garner the undivided support of the Court. In his
famous dissent in Di Santo, Justice Stone described the analysis employed by the
majority in that case as "too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too
remote from actualities, to be of value. ' '56 Stressing that the purpose of the Com-
45. Id. at 537. Justice Day stated that the Georgia law was "only a reasonable police regula-
tion, and not an unlawful attempt to regulate or hinder interstate commerce." Id.
46. 273 U.S. 34 (1927).
47. Id. at 35.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 37.
50. id. ("A state statute which by its necessary operation directly interferes with or burdens
foreign commerce is a prohibited regulation and invalid, regardless of the purpose with which it
was passed.").
51. 283 U.S. 380 (1931).
52. Id. at 386. The building of the station would also require a relocation of existing tracks.
Id. at 387.
53. See id. at 396; see also S. Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524,537 (1910) (upholding a Georgia
statute regulating the speed of trains at in-state crossings because the law was "only a reasonable
police regulation, and not an unlawful attempt to regulate or hinder interstate commerce").
54. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm'n, 283 U.S. at 395.
55. See Sam Kalen, Reawakening the Dormant Commerce Clause in Its First Century, 13 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 417,423 (1988). Compare S. Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. at 532-33 (sustaining a
statute requiring trains to slow to a near stop at numerous in-state crossings because of the
states' inherent power to regulate speeds in cities and towns), with Seaboard Air Line Ry. v.
Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310, 316 (1917) (invalidating a statute requiring trains to stop 124 times
during a 123-mile trip because of its direct burden on interstate commerce).
56. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34,44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting). Justices Brandeis
and Holmes joined Justice Stone in his dissent.
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merce Clause was "to prevent discrimination and the erection of barriers or ob-
stacles to the free flow of commerce, interstate or foreign," Stone argued that there
are instances where "matters of local concern" necessitate state regulation. 57 How-
ever, Stone suggested the use of a more "trustworthy formula" that considered "all
the facts and circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its function, the
character of the business involved and the actual effect on the flow of commerce"
in discerning whether the state regulation had gone too far.58
2. Contemporary Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
In the early 1940s, the Court embarked on a new campaign to "simplify" the
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Purporting to set aside the formulaic
national-local and direct-indirect tests of prior eras, the Court opted instead for a
more comprehensive approach to determine the constitutionality of state regula-
tion.59 The Court professed to adopt a two-tiered approach that classified state
regulations according to whether they directly discriminated against out-of-state
interests or regulated evenhandedly, but with indirect effects on interstate com-
merce.60 The hope with this new approach was to do away with the arbitrary
local-national and direct-indirect tests utilized by previous Courts. However, even
a cursory review of modem dormant Commerce Clause case law reveals that the
Court's current approach is not as straightforward as it first appears to be.6 1 Irre-
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945). Chief Justice Stone, endorsing
a pragmatic balancing approach, stated:
[T]he matters for ultimate determination here are the nature and extent of the burden
which the state regulation of interstate trains, adopted as a safety measure, imposes
on interstate commerce, and whether the relative weights of the state and national
interests involved are such as to make inapplicable the rule, generally observed, that
the free flow of interstate commerce and its freedom from local restraints in matters
requiring uniformity of regulation are interests safeguarded by the commerce clause
from state interference.
Id. (emphasis added).
60. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1986).
The Court described the current test as follows:
When a statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or
when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests, we
have generally struck down the statute without further inquiry. When, however, a
statute has only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly,
we have examined whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden
on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.
Id. at 579 (citations omitted).
61. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(referring to the current status of the dormant Commerce Clause as a "quagmire"); Am. Truck-
ing Ass'ns v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201-03 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing dissatis-
faction with the current dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and stating that "no [other]
body of our decisional law has changed as regularly"); Kassell v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of
Del., 450 U.S. 662, 706 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the plurality decision of
the Court offered no guidance to future courts and that the "jurisprudence of the 'negative side'
of the Commerce Clause remains hopelessly confused"). See also Maltz, supra note 34, at 55;
Eule, supra note 3, at 428. See generally Redish & Nugent, supra note 37 (arguing that the
dormant Commerce Clause is completely without textual justification).
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spective of its purpose, the modem approach is saturated with the language, meth-
odologies, and fundamental concerns of prior eras.6 2
Modem cases evidence a focus towards a statute's purpose and effect as well
as a clear disdain for statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce in fa-
vor of in-state interests.63 The Court has recently defined discrimination against
interstate commerce as the "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state eco-
nomic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter."'6 4 As recently
stated by the Court, statutes that discriminate against out-of-state commerce tend
to "excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed
to prevent."'65
Contemporary dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence also reveals the mod-
em Court's reasonable concern with the process of state regulation. 66 In this re-
spect, the dormant Commerce Clause seeks to ensure adequate political represen-
tation. In the often-quoted words of Justice Cardozo, the Constitution was created
in order to ensure that the "peoples of the several states [would] sink or swim
together," and that national uniformity would prevail over division.6 7 Thus, where
a state statute undermines this essential premise by unreasonably favoring the eco-
nomic interest of an in-state entity or individual over one from out-of-state, a court
will subject the statute to a rigorous judicial examination. 68 The Court has ad-
equately articulated the rationale behind such a critical examination by noting that
out-of-state individuals or entities may have little opportunity to voice their objec-
tion to a proposed regulation in the legislature of the enacting state. 69
The hallmark of the modem dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is the
Court's use of different levels of scrutiny in examining state legislation. The Court
62. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. at 579 (indicat-
ing that the focus of the modem analysis is on not only the direct and indirect effects of the
statute, but also the local interests involved); Lawrence, supra note 40, at 410 ("The Court's
reasoning in Cooley endures ... in the sense that the resolution of a particular case today will
turn in large part on a consideration of the local (state) interest in regulating local affairs .... ")
(emphasis added); see also West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. at 192 (noting that the
focus of the dormant Commerce Clause is on statutes that discriminate against interstate com-
merce and merely "benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors").
63. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. at 201 (stating that recent cases "have
eschewed formalism for a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes and effects"); Or. Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994). This Comment does not attempt to
enter into the debate over whether the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned with discrimina-
tory or protectionist state legislation. Compare Catherine Gage O'Grady, Targeting State Pro-
tectionism Instead of Interstate Discrimination Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN
DIEGo L. REV. 571, 575-76 (1997) (arguing that the focus of the courts in analyzing the validity
of state statutes should be on whether the statute impermissibly protects the economic interests
of the residents of the state enacting the statute), with Mark P. Gergen, Territoriality and the
Perils of Formalism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1735, 1740-41 (1988) (arguing that the focus of the courts
in the dormant Commerce Clause analysis should be on "state laws of disutility," that is, "laws
that enrich states but at the greater expense to out-of-staters or the nation").
64. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. at 99.
65. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
66. See Lawrence, supra note 40, at 411-13.
67. Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935); see also H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-34 (1949).
68. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978).
69. See S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-68, 767 n.2 (1945). The Court wrote:
"[Tlhe Court has often recognized that to the extent that the burden of state regulation falls on
interests outside the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political re-
straints normally exerted when interests within the state are affected." Id. at 767 n.2.
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will apply either a rule of per se invalidity to discriminatory statutes or a balancing
approach that affords state legislatures some deference. 70 Recent case law also
demonstrates that the Court prefers a heightened level of judicial intervention and
balancing of local and national interests.7 1 However, the Court appears to have
considerable difficulty defining the precise level of scrutiny to be applied to indi-
vidual cases. 72 Unfortunately for those desiring to find any rhyme or reason to the
Court's modem decisions, identifying the appropriate level of scrutiny is perhaps
the most critical element in the dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 73 As one
commentator has noted, defining the appropriate standard is "essentially ... out-
come determinative."'74 The Court's difficulty in this regard has thus prompted a
warranted flurry of criticism from commentators and judges alike.75 As the fol-
lowing discussion elucidates, the Court has created what amounts to three separate
levels of scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause. Essentially, the Court has
distinguished between statutes that facially discriminate against interstate com-
merce, those that discriminate against interstate commerce in purpose or effect,
and those that are facially neutral but impose an undue burden on interstate com-
merce. Equally important is that the dormant Commerce Clause restriction on a
state's ability to regulate is not absolute. In certain rare instances, states retain the
ability to regulate matters of local concern even when such legislation may ad-
versely affect interstate commerce. 7 6
a. Statutes Openly Discriminating Against Interstate Commerce
For statutes that openly discriminate against out-of-state economic interests
in order to protect in-state interests, the Court has imposed a per se rule of invalid-
ity.77 Only if a state is able to establish that it has not "needlessly obstruct[ed]
70. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578-79
(1986).
71. See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443-44 (1978) (unanimously
invalidating a Wisconsin law prohibiting the use of trucks longer than fifty-five feet in length on
state motorways and noting that regulations of a sufficiently local character are afforded a strong
presumption of validity in the balancing scheme); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970) (noting that where a "legitimate local purpose" is found, the statute's validity becomes a
question of degree). See generally Maltz, supra note 34, at 47-65. Professor Maltz's central
thesis is that the hallmark of the modem dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is its heavy
reliance on an ad hoc balancing approach that suffers from both a lack of flexibility and an
inability to adequately measure the competing interests involved.
72. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 99-114.
73. Whereas a state statute discriminating against interstate commerce is invariably struck
down without further inquiry, courts generally afford statutes with only incidental effects on
interstate commerce considerable deference. See O'Grady, supra note 63, at 574.
74. Id. Compare Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992) (invalidating an Oklahoma
statute requiring power plants to burn a coal mixture containing at least ten percent Oklahoma-
mined coal on the grounds that it discriminated against interstate commerce on its face and in
practical effect), with Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981) (up-
holding a Minnesota law prohibiting sale of milk in plastic containers, but allowing the sale of
milk in paper containers).
75. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
77. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating a law
prohibiting the importation of waste into New Jersey).
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interstate trade or attempted to 'place itself in a position of economic isolation'
will it survive the level of scrutiny applied in cases of affirmative discrimination. 7 8
The Court has noted that the "State's burden of justification [for discriminatory
restrictions] is so heavy that 'facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal de-
fect." 7 9 The argument against such statutes, best phrased by the Court in Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,80 is that they encourage the states to erect barriers to compe-
tition and "invite a speedy end of our national solidarity." 81 The Court also ad-
dressed its focus on a state's economic objective in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du
Mond.82 Stating that "our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut
of powers necessary to control of the economy,"83 the majority noted that the fo-
cus of the Commerce Clause is not only to ensure free market access and free
competition, but also to do away with home embargoes and customs duties. 84
In 1978, the Court provided additional insight into its concerns with discrimi-
natory state regulation. In Philadelphia v. New Jersey,85 the Court considered a
New Jersey statute prohibiting the importation of solid or liquid waste from sur-
rounding states. 86 Noting that the crucial first step in the analysis is to determine
whether the statute in question "is basically a protectionist measure," the divided
Court expressed its apprehension with the "evils of economic isolation." 87 In the
eyes of the Court, the "evils" of economic isolationism and protectionism could
devastate a national free market economy and could rest in either the legislative
means or the legislative ends. 88 Relying heavily on the fact that the statute prohib-
ited certain waste solely on the basis of origin, the Court found that, regardless of
the New Jersey Legislature's environmental and health related aims, the statute
violated the Commerce Clause "[b]oth on its face and in its plain effect" by
"impos[ing] on out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of conserving the
State's remaining landfill space."'89
78. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,
527 (1935)). Maine v. Taylor involved a Maine regulation prohibiting the importation of baitfish
into the state. Id. at 132. Finding that the preservation of the state's lakes served a legitimate
objective and that the only way in which to achieve that objective was to discriminate against
interstate commerce, the Court sustained the regulation. Id. at 15 1.
79. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 101 (1994) (quoting Hughes
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979)).
80. 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (unanimously invalidating a New York statute prohibiting the sale of
out-of-state milk in New York at less than a fixed price in order to protect local economic inter-
ests).
81. Id. at 523.
82. 336 U.S. 525 (1949). In this case, the State of New York denied H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.
a license to build a milk plant in the village of Greenwich on the grounds that it would destroy
the New York milk market and increase costs to in-state plants. Id. at 527-28. Finding that a
state may not "burden or constrict the flow of... commerce for their economic advantage," the
Court invalidated New York's determination. Id. at 533.
83. Id. at 537.
84. Id. at 539. Notably, the Court in both Baldwin and H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. recognized
that the states have extensive powers to protect the citizens of a state "against perils to health or
safety." Id. at 531-32.
85. 437 U.S. 617 (1978)
86. Id. at 618. The State of New Jersey had essentially blocked the importation of solid and
liquid waste from neighboring states under the purported aim of protecting the citizens of New
Jersey from the harmful effects of pollutants. Id. at 618-19.
87. Id. at 624.
88. Id. at 626.
89. Id. at 626-28.
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Similarly, in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy,90 the Court again focused its
attention on the protectionist nature of a Massachusetts pricing order that imposed
an assessment on all milk sales within the state, but distributed the proceeds of the
assessment fund only to in-state dairy farmers. 9 1 Finding that the "avowed pur-
pose and undisputed effect [of the law is] to enable higher cost Massachusetts
dairy farmers to compete with lower cost dairy farmers in other states," the Court
found the statute to be "clearly unconstitutional. '9 2 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Stevens reasoned that because the effect of the Massachusetts statute was to
allow local producers to fully develop their market share at the expense of out-of-
state producers, it undeniably created an "economic barrier against competition"
and "'neutraliz[ed] advantages belonging to the place of origin.' 9 3
As the Baldwin and Philadelphia v. New Jersey line of cases suggest, the Court's
focus in this field is on statutes that serve merely to protect in-state commercial
interests. 94 The Court has repeatedly stated that free market access and national
solidarity are fundamental ideals under the Commerce Clause. 95 Presumably, the
Court's concern with state actions designed to favor in-state interests over out-of-
state interests is that if such initiatives were allowed, a return to the "economic
Balkanization" under the Articles of Confederation would be inevitable.9 6 Conse-
quently, where a state regulation inhibits free market access by erecting unreason-
able barriers to commerce solely based on origin, the Court has consistently held
that the state regulation will be subject to the most exacting scrutiny.
b. Statutes Discriminating Against Interstate Commerce in Purpose or Effect
The Court purports to subject statutes that are facially neutral but discrimina-
tory in purpose or effect to a similarly strict test of constitutionality. As the Court
noted in Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority,97 it
90. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
91. Id. at 188.
92. Id. at 194. The Court divided 7-2 in holding that the statute violated the Commerce
Clause. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing not only that the
statute was evenhanded in its similar treatment of in-state and out-of-state interests, but also that
the Court's current dormant Commerce Clause policy "bodes ill for the values of federalism
which have long animated our constitutional jurisprudence." Id. at 214-17.
93. Id. at 196 n. 11 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,527 (1935)). Accord
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 96, 108 (1994) (finding an Oregon
surcharge on in-state disposal of solid waste facially invalid where it imposed a $2.24 per ton
charge on out-of-state waste and an $0.85 per ton charge on in-state waste); Wyoming v. Okla-
homa, 502 U.S. 437 (1992) (striking down an Oklahoma statute requiring power plants to bum
a coal mixture containing at least ten percent Oklahoma-mined coal); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491
U.S. 324, 326 (1989) (invalidating a Connecticut statute requiring that out-of-state shippers sell
beer at the same prices in-state as they did in neighboring states); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322 (1979) (finding that an Oklahoma law prohibiting the shipment of minnows out of state
violated the Commerce Clause).
94. See, e.g., O'Grady, supra note 63, at 634 ("There is value in a dormant Commerce Clause
review model that expressly recognizes resident protectionism as a concept unique from dis-
crimination and as the primary evil to be addressed by the dormant Commerce Clause."); see
generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091, 1094-98 (1986).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18.
97. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
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will generally invalidate discriminatory statutes "without further inquiry."9 8 In
practice, however, the standard of review in cases involving latent discrimination
is far from uniform. 99 Arguably, the Court considers statutes with a discrimina-
tory purpose or effect to be per se invalid unless the state is able to satisfy its heavy
burden of demonstrating not only a legitimate local purpose, but also that the pur-
pose could not be obtained by less discriminatory means. 100 For example, in Hunt
v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,10 1 the Court considered a North
Carolina law requiring that imported apple cartons bear a "U.S. grade" as opposed
to individual state grades. 102 The undeniable effect of the North Carolina statute
was to discriminate against produce from the State of Washington, whose stan-
dards were equal to or greater than the U.S. standard. 10 3 Although the Court found
the statute to be neutral on its face in that it subjected all produce to the same
grading specifications, the Court nevertheless determined that the statute imper-
missibly burdened interstate commerce. 104 In so deciding, the Court conspicu-
ously applied an enhanced level of judicial scrutiny to the North Carolina carton-
labeling requirement. 105 The test applied by the Court required an elevated bur-
den on the part of the state to substantiate the regulation "both in terms of the local
benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alter-
natives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake." 106 After all was said and
done, the Court concluded that North Carolina did not carry its elevated burden by
failing to show not only that the challenged regulation furthered the purported goal
of eliminating deceptive labeling, but also that the scheme was the only available
alternative. 10 7
Comparing Hunt with Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 10 8 it becomes
evident that the Court has managed to tangle itself in the web of the dormant Com-
98. Id. at 579.
99. Compare Kassell v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981) (plural-
ity holding that an Iowa statute prohibiting sixty-five-foot trucks on its freeways violated the
Commerce Clause where the law impermissibly interfered with commerce of other states and
the safety benefits were illusory), Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
350-51 (1977) (invalidating a North Carolina law requiring that imported apple cartons bear a
"U.S. grade" and not individual state grades, thereby discriminating against Washington, whose
standards were equal to or greater than the U.S. standard), and H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 545 (1949) (striking down a New York law denying a milk dealer's license
to build and operate an additional facility within the state to protect in-state dealers), with Min-
nesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473-74 (1981) (sustaining a Minnesota stat-
ute prohibiting the sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable containers because the regulation was
not "clearly excessive" and advanced the legitimate interests of conserving resources).
100. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1994); Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 473-74; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
101. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
102. Id. at 335.
103. Id. at 351-52. The Court agreed with the district court's finding that the statute had the
effect of "raising the costs of doing business in the North Carolina market for Washington apple
growers and dealers, while leaving those of their North Carolina counterparts unaffected." Id. at
351. Moreover, the statute effectively stripped Washington of its competitive advantage in the
apple industry-an advantage it earned by way of an expensive inspection and grading system.
Id.
104. Id. at 351-54.
105. Id. at 353.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 353-54.
108. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
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merce Clause. In Clover Leaf Creamery Co., the Court considered a Minnesota
statute that banned the sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable contain-
ers, but allowed the use of nonrefillable paperboard cartons. 109 The declared pur-
pose of the statute was to promote conservation and ease the burden on state dis-
posal methods. 1l0 Although not discriminatory on its face in that in-state and out-
of-state firms would both need to change from plastic to paperboard cartons, the
Minnesota Legislature's initiative unquestionably favored Minnesota pulpwood
manufacturers over out-of-state plastic producers. 1 l Instead of applying the el-
evated level of scrutiny described above for discriminatory-in-effect state statutes,
however, the Court scrutinized the Minnesota statute under a lower level of scru-
tiny.112 Applying the lower standard, the Court upheld the Minnesota law because
the incidental burden on interstate commerce did not clearly outweigh the local
benefits involved. 113
As noted, the level of scrutiny applied in cases involving state regulations
with latent discriminatory effects is, at best, erratic. In certain instances, a height-
ened scrutiny analysis will be applied: the state must demonstrate not only a le-
gitimate objective, but also that it has chosen the least discriminatory means avail-
able. 114 In other cases, a lower level of scrutiny will be applied that tests whether
the benefits outweigh the burden on interstate commerce. In evaluating state regu-
lations with discriminatory effects, the Court has thus chartered an uneven course
without providing a meaningful explanation of why certain statutes are evaluated
under a lower level of scrutiny.
c. Statutes Imposing an Incidental Burden on Interstate Commerce
Statutes that do not discriminate towards out-of-state interests, but that inci-
dentally affect the free flow of commerce, receive a unique and controversial treat-
ment by the Court. 115 The Court's contemporary approach in this area appears to
have stemmed from Justice Stone's dissent in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,116 which
suggested a more comprehensive analysis of purposes and effects as well as bal-
ancing competing interests. 117 The seminal case of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 118
embodies the Court's current formulation towards these "evenhanded" state stat-
utes. 119 Justice Stewart described the test for evenhanded state regulations as
follows:
109. Id. at 458.
110. Id. at 458-59.
111. Id. at 472-73.
112. See Maltz, supra note 34, at 53-54. Reasoning that "Minnesota's statute does not effect
'simple protectionism,' but 'regulates evenhandedly,"' the Court scrutinized the state law under
the Pike balancing scheme, discussed infra. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
at 471-72.
113. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 472-74. The Court reasoned that a
facially nondiscriminatory statute is "not invalid simply because it causes some business to shift
from a predominantly out-of-state industry to a predominantly in-state industry. Only if the
burden on interstate commerce clearly outweighs the State's legitimate purposes does such a
regulation violate the Commerce Clause." Id. at 474.
114. See Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352-54 (1976).
115. See infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
116. 273 U.S. 34 (1927).
117. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
118. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
119. Maltz, supra note 34, at 49; O'Grady, supra note 63, at 613-14.
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Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activi-
ties. 120
In effect, Pike stands for the proposition that many facially neutral statutes that
survive the Court's categorical rules may still fall to an ad hoc balancing scheme. 12 1
In Pike, the Court evaluated an Arizona statute that prohibited the interstate ship-
ment of cantaloupes grown in-state unless shipped in approved containers bearing
the Arizona name. 122 An Arizona grower, Bruce Church, Inc., opted instead to
send its cantaloupes to a processing plant thirty-one miles away in California, which
happened to be the closest packaging plant. 12 3 Finding that the Arizona statute
regulated "evenhandedly," the Court formulated a test that considers the effect of
the state regulation to determine whether the local benefits outweigh the burdens
on out-of-state commercial interests. 124 Applying this test, the Court determined
that the state interest in protecting and preserving the reputation of Arizona grow-
ers was legitimate. 125 Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the act because the
$200,000 cost to construct a new packing facility was a burden that outweighed
any state interests involved. 126
Critics are particularly opposed to the Court's modem approach of employing
the Pike balancing test to invalidate facially neutral state legislation. The argu-
ment raised most often by those challenging the use of balancing in cases involv-
ing evenhanded statutes is that the weighing of legitimate competing interests is
best left either to the legislatures of the states or to Congress. 12 7 Arguments have
also been made that a judicial balancing approach leads to imprecise and unpre-
dictable results because it weighs dissimilar concerns and could involve the "per-
120. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted).
121. Eule, supra note 3, at 474-75.
122. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. at 138.
123. id. at 139.
124. Id. at 142-43.
125. Id. at 143.
126. Id. at 146. See also Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 891
(1988) (invalidating an Ohio law tolling limitations period to out-of-state corporations that did
not consent to jurisdiction where the "significant" burden exceeded benefits to the state); Ray-
mond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444-45 (1978) (finding a Wisconsin law pro-
hibiting the use of fifty-five-foot trailers on interstate highway unconstitutional where the safety
benefits were illusory).
127. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. at 897-98 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that the Court should "abandon the 'balancing' approach [in] negative Commerce
Clause cases ... and leave essentially legislative judgments to Congress"); CTS Corp. v. Dy-
namic Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the courts are ill suited
to weigh benefits and burdens and that such an approach "should be undertaken rarely if at all");
Maltz, supra note 34, at 59-61 (ardently opposing judicial interference because the role of inter-
est-weighing should be left to the legislature); Eule, supra note 3, at 442 n.89 ("If democracy
means anything, it is that the choice between competing substantive political values must be
made by representatives of the people rather than by unelected judges.").
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sonal value judgments and prejudices of the judge."'128 Although Pike continues
to be cited by the federal courts, a review of circuit court opinions reveals that
judges are not certain as to when to apply the balancing test. 129 Specifically, there
appears to be a split among the circuits concerning whether a court will apply the
ad hoc balancing scheme to all evenhanded statutes or merely to those that result
in disparate treatment between in-state and out-of-state interests. 130 Several cir-
cuit judges have thus interpreted the Pike case as the Supreme Court's directive to
balance the putative local benefits against the burdens on interstate commerce only
in cases where the state regulation is neutral on its face, but clearly disfavors out-
of-state interests. 1 3 1 That the lower federal courts have had considerable diffi-
culty in ascertaining when to apply the Court's featured balancing scheme merely
lends credence to the arguments of several present Justices of the Court that the
current dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is utterly "unworkable. '132
B. The Extraterritoriality Principle
Against the legal template described above, a line of cases has developed
wherein federal courts have, under the dormant Commerce Clause, invalidated
state legislation having "the 'practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring
wholly outside" the boundaries of the state.133 This principle, commonly referred
128. EDWARD F. HENNESSEY, JUDGES MAKING LAW 55 (1994). Justice Hennessey served as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts from 1976 to 1989. See also
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 619 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("[O]ur open-ended balancing tests in this area have allowed us to reach different
results based merely 'on differing assessments of the force of competing analogies."').
129. See O'Grady, supra note 63, at 620-21.
130. Compare Grant's Dairy-Maine, LLC v. Comm'r, 232 F.3d 8, 24 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding
that an evenhanded statute did not trigger the Pike balancing test where plaintiff did not make a
sufficient showing of a substantial burden and noting that the test stands on "uncertain legal
terrain"), Automated Salvage Transp., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Envtl. Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 59, 75
(2nd Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a statute must have a disparate impact between intrastate and
interstate interests to warrant invalidation under the Pike test), Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Com-
puter Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d 813, 825-26 (3rd Cir. 1994) (stating that nondiscriminatory
state statutes are not subject to the balancing scheme of Pike), and Nat'l Paint & Coatings Ass'n
v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1131 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that Pike is not universally appli-
cable and that only laws with "mild disparate effects and potential neutral justifications" are
subject to the balancing test), with E. Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Court, 127 F.3d 532, 544-45 (6th Cir.
1997) (calling for the use of the balancing test so long as the statute regulates evenhandedly),
and Am. Target Adver., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1254 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding the Pike
analysis applicable if an act simply regulates evenhandedly).
131. See, e.g., Nat'l Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d at 1130-31 (stating
that balancing is not "universally applicable"); Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum
Corp., 35 F.3d at 826-27 (stressing that legislation "will not be invalidated under the Pike test
unless it imposes discriminative burdens on interstate commerce"); but see Medigen of Ky., Inc.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 985 F.2d 164, 165-67 (4th Cir. 1993) (balancing the restrictions on
market entry with the goal of providing universal service in evaluating a statute which required
haulers of infectious waste to obtain a certificate from the Public Service Commission of Ken-
tucky without first considering discrimination or state protectionism).
132. E.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 636 (1997)
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas stated that "[p]recedent as unworkable as our negative
Commerce Clause jurisprudence has become is simply not entitled to the weight of stare deci-
sis." Id.
133. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989) (emphasis added).
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to by judges and commentators as the extraterritoriality principle, holds that a state"may not 'project its legislation into [other States].' 134 The focus of the courts in
this area is whether the "practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct
beyond the boundaries of the State." 135 The Court, in Healy v. Beer Institute,136
succinctly stated that state regulations of this nature offend the Constitution's "spe-
cial concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by
state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the
individual State within their respective spheres."' 13 7 As section II.A. 1 and Part III
of this Article discuss in detail, these concerns are not new nor are they illegiti-
mate. Consequently, courts generally consider state initiatives that run contrary to
these interests virtually invalid per se. 13 8 Generally, the courts have used this
principle under the Commerce Clause. 139 However, at least one commentator has
questioned the characterization of the extraterritoriality principle as a dormant Com-
merce Clause issue. 14 0
In order to tackle the question of where, if at all, the extraterritoriality prin-
ciple "fits" into the dormant Commerce Clause, reviewing the decisions of the
federal courts that implicate the principle is important. Reviewing the decisions
implicating the principle in section II.B.1 will shed some light on both the ele-
ments as well as the underlying concerns of the extraterritoriality principle. The
focus of section II.B.2 builds upon the discussion in the preceding section and,
more importantly, exposes the difficulties the lower federal courts have had in
interpreting the language and directives of the Supreme Court concerning extrater-
ritorial state legislation. The following sections attempt to garner support for the
ultimate assertion of this Comment-that integrating the extraterritoriality prin-
ciple into the framework of the dormant Commerce Clause merely confuses the
underlying issues involved in particular disputes.
134. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582-83 (1986)
(alteration in original) (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935)). See
also Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881) (stating that a state may not legislate"except with reference to its own jurisdiction").
135. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 336 (citation omitted).
136. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
137. Id. at 335-36 (footnote omitted).
138. 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-8, at 1074 (3d ed. 2000). E.g.,
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 336 ("[A] statute that directly controls commerce occurring
wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State's
authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute's extraterritorial reach was intended by
the legislature."); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. at 579
(stating that a statute which directly regulates interstate commerce will "generally [be] struck
down.., without further inquiry").
139. E.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. at 582 ("[w]e
agree ... [that the New York affirmation law] regulates out-of-state transactions in violation of
the Commerce Clause").
140. Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (IH) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1865, 1873 (1987). At one point in his article, Professor Regan considers whether the extrater-
ritoriality principle should be located under a clause other than the Commerce Clause. Specifi-
cally, he considers whether the principle should be located within the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the Due Process Clause, or the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Id. at 1887-94. Professor
Regan concludes that these alternate clauses are not likely candidates for containing the extra-
territoriality principle; rather, he argues that the principle is best viewed as an independent prin-
ciple operating to restrain state legislation in certain instances. Id. at 1895.
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1. The Supreme Court Framework
To properly evaluate the extraterritoriality principle and to attempt to devise a
workable framework, discussing the principle in light of the decisions that brought
it to life is essential. The early decisions of the Court in this area tended to involve
challenges to state affirmation laws. These laws require that distributors avow that
they will sell certain products in-state at a price equivalent to that which they re-
ceive for out-of-state sales. 14 1 The fundamental problem with such laws, aptly
stated by Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, is that they
also carry with them the "implied command: 'Charge outside this state the same
price you charge inside it.' 142 This implied command is what exceeds a state
legislature's power. Other decisions involved challenges to state anti-takeover
statutes. These laws, enacted by over two-thirds of the states, served to protect
local corporations from hostile tender offers made by companies seeking to take
control of the local "target" corporation. 14 3 The following Supreme Court cases
provide the constitutional framework for the extraterritoriality principle. More
importantly, they assist with uncovering the concerns that underlie the enactment
of the legislation, the effects of which may be felt outside a state's borders.
a. Brown-Forman Distillers v. New York State Liquor Authority
In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority,14 4 the
Court examined a New York price affirmation law requiring liquor distillers to
affirm that the prices of beverages sold in-state were no higher than the lowest
prices in other states. 145 When the Brown-Forman Distillers Corporation offered
promotional allowances to wholesalers in other states, the New York State Liquor
Authority instituted license revocation proceedings against the company. 146 Brown-
Forman subsequently brought suit in state court, challenging the law on Com-
merce Clause grounds. 147 After losing in both the New York Supreme Court as
well as the Court of Appeals, Brown-Forman appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court. 148 On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that, by its terms, the regu-
lation at issue in Brown-Forman was directed at liquor sales occurring within the
State of New York. 149 Nevertheless, by finding that the affirmation law had the
effect of not only forcing distilleries to abandon promotional plans in other states,
but also forcing other states to alter their regulatory schemes, the Court invalidated
141. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326 (1989).
142. K-S Pharmacies, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 962 F.2d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 1992).
143. LARRY D. SODERQUIST ET AL., CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES,
MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 852-53 (5th ed. 2001).
144. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
145. Id. at 575.
146. Id. at 576-77.
147. Id. at 578.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 583.
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the New York legislation as a direct restraint on interstate commerce. 150 Drawing
upon an implicit assertion in the plurality opinion of Edgar v. MITE Corp.15 1 to
support this holding, the Court reasoned that the Commerce Clause mandates that
a state may not force an out-of-state merchant "to seek regulatory approval in one
State before undertaking a transaction in another." 152 In so holding, the Court
established that a state may not regulate transactions occurring beyond its bor-
ders. 153
The Brown-Forman Court's basis for concluding that the affirmation law was
unconstitutional likely did not rest solely on the grounds that the "practical effect"
of the law was to control the price of liquor in neighboring states. Significantly, at
the time of the Brown-Forman decision in 1986, thirty-nine states had adopted
affirmation statutes to regulate the prices of liquor to be distributed within their
respective borders. 154 Judging by the numbers alone, the fear that the prolifera-
tion of state affirmation laws would impede the interstate distribution market by
subjecting liquor distributors to numerous and conflicting regulations was very
real indeed. 15 5 This fact tends to suggest that the Court's underlying concern with
the New York statute was, in large part, due to the probability that the inconsistent
regulations would clog the channels of interstate commerce. 156 The Court likely
envisioned a scenario where a New England liquor distributor would be forced to
engage in the insufferable task of calculating, on a monthly basis, the different
prices that it could charge in the six separate New England states.
150. Id. at 583-84. Notably, the decision was not unanimous. Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices White and Rehnquist dissented, noting, inter alia, that the majority's reliance on Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) to invalidate the New York Act was misplaced. The
dissent distinguished Baldwin from the New York Act on the grounds that the Act "was designed
to keep the prices of liquor down in order to give New York consumers the benefit of out-of-
state competition." Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. at 590.
In the eyes of the dissenters, the regulation at issue in Baldwin differed in that it "was designed
to inflate milk prices in order to protect New York producers from out-of-state competition-a
classic illustration of economic provincialism." Id. (citation omitted).
151. 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982) (plurality opinion). In MITE, the Court considered require-
ments under an Illinois corporations statute that tender offers be filed with the state and the
target company twenty days before the offer would become effective. Id. at 627. Moreover, the
statute not only gave the state of Illinois the opportunity to hold a hearing on the substantive
fairness of the offer, but also required corporations to register their tender offers if the corpora-
tion was either organized under Illinois law or had ten percent of its assets located in Illinois. Id.
The statute thus applied to a great number of corporations, many without significant ties to
Illinois. Justice White and Chief Justice Burger determined that such provisions had a "sweep-
ing extraterritorial effect" and that the statute was a direct restraint on interstate commerce be-
cause the Illinois law "could be applied to regulate a tender offer which would not affect a single
Illinois shareholder." Id. at 642. In effect, the decision instigated the use of the dormant Com-
merce Clause as a vehicle to invalidate state regulation thought to overstep its bounds. See
Gaylord, supra note 23, at 1110-11.
152. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Auth., 476 U.S. at 582.
153. Id. at 585. The Court stated that "the most important issue [is] whether the statute
regulate[s] out-of-state transactions." Id. at 581.
154. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 334 n.10 (1989). According to the Healy Court,
twenty states had statutes that were similar to the New York statute at issue in Brown-Forman.
Id.
155. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. at 583.
156. The Court mentioned this concern at one point in the opinion in dicta, but seemed to rely
more heavily on the premise that the effect of the affirmation law was to "project" its legislation
into surrounding states. Id. at 583-84.
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b. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
A year after Brown-Forman, the Court appeared to elaborate upon the prin-
ciples underlying the extraterritoriality principle in the case of CTS Corp. v. Dy-
namics Corp. of America.157 The issue in CTS concerned the validity of an Indi-
ana statute (Indiana Act) designed to protect shareholders from hostile tender of-
fers and to ensure that investors had a voice in corporate affairs. 158 The Indiana
Act attempted to further these goals by conditioning the power to vote a control-
ling block of shares on the approval of a majority of the incumbent disinterested
shareholders. 159 Dynamics Corporation made a tender offer for the CTS Corpora-
tion and, shortly thereafter, filed suit in federal court challenging the constitution-
ality of the Indiana Act on Commerce Clause grounds. 160
The Court noted that the Indiana Act could not withstand constitutional scru-
tiny under the Commerce Clause if the effect of the statute was either to discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce or to "adversely affect interstate commerce by
subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations."' 16 1 However, the Court held that
the Indiana Act did not offend either principle. 16 2 The majority reasoned that the
Indiana Act was not discriminatory because it similarly affected in-state and out-
of-state offerors. 16 3 Furthermore, the Court found that the Indiana Act merely
defined shareholder voting rights in corporations organized under Indiana law-a
power traditionally viewed as within the province of state corporation statutes. 164
The Court concluded that, because the Indiana Act applied only to corporations
organized under Indiana law, a corporation would be subject to the law of only one
state as opposed to several. 165
As one commentator has suggested, Justice Powell's reference to "inconsis-
tent regulations" implicated the Court's concern with the extraterritorial effects of
the Indiana Act. 166 This suggestion has considerable merit because the majority
cited both MITE and Brown-Forman for the proposition that a central concern of
the Commerce Clause is to avoid subjecting entities to conflicting regulations. 167
The sections cited from the two opinions are those in which the Court discussed
the extraterritoriality principle and the underlying concern with impeding the flow
of interstate commerce. Interestingly, the Court also cited language from Cooley
v. Board of Wardens 168 in support of its assertion that the Commerce Clause pro-
hibits the interference with interstate commerce by way of inconsistent regula-
tions. 169 That the Court quoted language from Cooley not only sheds some light
157. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
158. Id. at 75-76, 91.
159. ld. at 74.
160. Id. at 75.
161. Id. at 87-88 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, also agreed
that a statute that subjects activities to inconsistent regulations may violate the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 95.
162. Id. at 94.
163. Id. at 87.
164. Id. at 88-89.
165. Id. at 89.
166. Regan, supra note 140, at 1869.
167. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. at 88.
168. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
169. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. at 88-89 (stating that "the Commerce
Clause prohibits States from regulating subjects that 'are in their nature national, or admit only
of one uniform system, or plan of regulation"') (quoting Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12
How.) at 319).
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on the Court's expanding view of the extraterritoriality principle, but also lends
credence to Professor Michael A. Lawrence's 170 assertion that the national-local
distinction still plays a significant role in modem dormant Commerce Clause deci-
sions. 17 1
The majority responded to these concerns regarding the extraterritorial effect
of the Indiana Act in an interesting way. Justice Powell began by noting that every
state in the country had enacted general corporation statutes governing and prohib-
iting various business transactions. 172 He continued by observing that these cor-
poration statutes, with their myriad of limitations on business transactions, are
legitimate and enforceable against both resident and nonresident shareholders of
the corporation. 173 In effect, Justice Powell asserted that the Indiana Act could
legitimately affect out-of-state shareholders. Justice Powell's assertion to this ef-
fect suggested that a state may enact legislation that, to a certain extent, reaches
beyond the borders of a state. 174 Fortunately, he hinted as to where the line distin-
guishing valid from invalid extraterritorial state statutes may lie. He noted that the
Indiana Act applied only to corporations with a "substantial number" of Indiana
shareholders and, more importantly, that "every application of the Indiana Act will
affect a substantial number of Indiana residents." 175 One may infer from this
suggestion that where a state has a significant interest in regulating a particular
aspect of interstate commerce, it may do so, regardless of the extraterritorial effect
of the legislation, if the regulation also affects a substantial number of in-state
residents. Denying a state the ability to legislate in all instances where the legisla-
tion has effects beyond the borders of the state seems unreasonably restrictive. 176
c. Healy v. The Beer Institute
The implied assertion in CTS that the extraterritoriality principle embodies an
underlying concern with inconsistent regulations was made explicit in the case of
Healy v. Beer Institute. 17 7 The statute at issue in Healy required out-of-state brew-
ers to affirm that beer prices in Connecticut were, at the moment they were posted,
no higher than the prices in Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode Island. 17 8 The
law further required that the affirmed price remain in effect for a period of one
month. 179 The Connecticut Legislature enacted the statute to ensure that Con-
necticut consumers received the lowest possible prices for beer purchases. 180 In
170. Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University.
171. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
172. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. at 89-90. Justice Powell listed several
examples of restrictions that a state corporation statute may contain that serve to protect against
unwanted mergers, including: supermajority voting provisions, dissenter's rights provisions,
restrictions on payment of dividends, and staggered board provisions. Id. at 90, 90 n. 12.
173. Id. at 90 n.12.
174. See id. at 92-93. See also Regan, supra note 140, at 1877-78.
175. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. at 93.
176. See Regan, supra note 140, at 1878 ("It is clear that the Court cannot flatly prohibit all
state laws that have extraterritorial effects, or even all state laws that have substantial extraterri-
torial effects. Such a prohibition would invalidate much too much legislation.").
177. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
178. Id. at 326.
179. Id. at 329.
180. Id. at 341.
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examining the Connecticut statute, the Healy Court summarized the attributes of
the extraterritoriality principle. According to the Court, the extraterritoriality prin-
ciple stands for several related propositions. These principles, listed in full for the
sake of clarity, include:
First, the "Commerce Clause ... precludes the application of a state statute to
commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not
the commerce has effects within the State" . . . and, specifically, a State may not
adopt legislation that has the practical effect of establishing "a scale of prices for
use in other states." Second, a statute that directly controls commerce occurring
wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enact-
ing State's authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute's extraterri-
torial reach was intended by the legislature.... Third, the practical effect of the
statute must be evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the statute
itself, but also by considering how the challenged statute may interact with the
legitimate regulatory regimes of other States and what effect would arise if not
one, but many or every, State adopted similar legislation. Generally speaking,
the Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising from the
projection of one state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State. 181
In passing, the majority likened the restraint on a state's ability to legislate extra-
territorially to the restrictions on a state's power to obtain personal jurisdiction
over an out-of-state individual or entity. 182 Applying the above principles, the
Court invalidated the Connecticut statute on the grounds that it impermissibly con-
trolled commercial activity occurring in the surrounding states. 183
Over a vigorous dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the majority reasoned
that the effect of the statute would be to not only control commercial activity be-
yond the state's borders, but also generate competing regulatory regimes in neigh-
boring states. 184 Specifically, the majority noted that the interaction of the Con-
necticut statute with discount statutes in Massachusetts, New York, and Rhode
Island resulted in beer shippers being forced to abandon competitive pricing schemes
in other states based on prevailing market conditions in those states. 185 Due to
this interaction as well as the potential that other states in the nation could enact
similar affirmation statutes, the majority concluded that Connecticut's statute had
an impermissible "extraterritorial effect." 186 In essence, the majority determined
that, because of the risk of "price gridlock" on a regional and perhaps even a na-
tional scale, the regulation of such pricing mechanisms should be left to Congress. 187
The majority's conclusion in Healy did not go unchallenged. Agreeing only
with the majority's determination that the Connecticut affirmation statute effected
an impermissible facial discrimination against interstate commerce, Justice Scalia
181. Id. at 336-37 (citations omitted). It is the third of these propositions that makes explicit
what Justice Powell implied in CTS. Notably, the Court cited the CTS opinion as support for its
assertion.
182. Id. at 336 n.13 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982), and Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)).
183. Id. at 337-39.
184. Id. at 337-38.
185. Id. at 338-40.
186. Id. In addition, the Court found that the Connecticut statute also violated the Commerce
Clause on the ground that it discriminated against brewers and shippers engaged in interstate
commerce. Id. at 340.
187. Id.
2003]
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refused to accept the view that the statute had an extraterritorial effect. 188 Calling
the majority's rationale "questionable," Justice Scalia found it unreasonable to in-
validate the statute merely because of the "economic reality that the challenged act
will require sellers in [surrounding states] to take account of the price that they
must post and charge in Connecticut when setting their prices in... other states."' 189
Justice Scalia's argument in this regard seems to parallel Justice Powell's sugges-
tion in CTS that a state law may legitimately affect out of state residents. 190 In
fact, he remarked that "innumerable valid state laws" exist that compel a seller to
alter pricing decisions in other states. 19 1 Thus, Justice Scalia implied that to ac-
cept the majority's view of the extraterritoriality principle, the courts would be
required to invalidate an excessive amount of state legislation.
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist similarly disagreed with the majority's
holding that the Connecticut statute had an extraterritorial reach. In a dissent simi-
lar to that in Brown-Forman, Justice Rehnquist opposed the use of the extraterrito-
riality principle to invalidate the Connecticut statute. 19 2 He first noted that the
parties had not put forth any evidence to show that beer prices in neighboring
states had been in any way affected by the Connecticut law. 193 Next, he rejected
the view that Connecticut had forced its regulatory regime controlling beer prices
into other states. 194 Rather, he stated that such a view "is simply the Court's per-
sonal forecast about the business strategies that distributors may use to set their
prices in light of regulatory obligations in various states."' 195 In making this state-
ment, the Chief Justice clarified that the indirect effect of the Connecticut legisla-
tion may be to influence business transactions and marketing activities in surround-
ing states. However, he observed that distributors are under no legal obligation to
consider the affirmation law when planning their pricing schemes in other states. 196
In this sense, at least in the eyes of the dissenters, the Connecticut Legislature did
not force or project its legislation into neighboring states. Rather, it enacted a law
that would constrain the ability of a distiller to charge higher prices in Connecticut
without similarly charging higher prices in neighboring states. Thus, the statute
served as one consideration of a distiller when deciding whether or not to charge
particular prices in the region. The Chief Justice's argument suggests that a state
regulation should not be struck down as a per se violation of the Commerce Clause
where a party has the freedom to choose whether to enter into a particular transac-
tion.
In summary, the line of decisions extending from MITE to Healy essentially
suggests that the Court views state regulations that extend beyond the borders of
the enacting state to be per se invalid under the Commerce Clause. The extraterri-
toriality line of cases seems to have markedly expanded the traditional dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence by further restraining the ability of states to enact
188. Id. at 345.
189. Id. (emphasis added). He argued that such rationale would have the objectionable con-
sequence of having decisions turn on the "degree of economic effect" of the statute in question.
Id.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75.
191. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 345.
192. Id. at 346-47. See also sources cited supra note 150.
193. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 347.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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advantageous legislation. The extraterritoriality cases decided by the Supreme
Court have effectively introduced a new inquiry into the traditional dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis: whether a state legislature has the power to influence ac-
tivity beyond the borders of the state in which it sits. This focus on the territorial
reach of state legislation stands in stark contrast to the long-established concentra-
tion on state regulations that are discriminatory or protectionist in nature. 197
The Court has not only expanded the traditional scope of the dormant Com-
merce Clause by incorporating an inquiry into the legislation's extraterritorial ef-
fect, but has also confused the analysis in such a way that raises significant con-
cerns. First, the language chosen by the Court to define the elements of the extra-
territoriality principle and the standard of review lacks clarity. Conspicuously
absent from the decisions implicating the extraterritoriality principle is a discus-
sion of what constitutes an "inconsistent regulation" and when a statute has effects
occurring "wholly outside" the borders of the state. The Court's omission in defin-
ing these elements is troubling because of the lack of guidance it gives to lower
federal courts that must employ the Supreme Court's analysis in adjudicating other
matters raising extraterritoriality concerns.
Additionally, the Court's approach evidences a concentration on distinguish-
ing state legislation based on whether the regulation directly or indirectly regu-
lates commerce beyond the enacting state's borders. 198 Under the Supreme Court
framework, outlined in Healy,199 the federal courts are required to strike down
state legislation that directly controls commerce beyond the enacting state's bor-
ders. The Court's concentration on such a formal, direct-indirect distinction is
even more disconcerting than its inability to adequately define the elements of the
extraterritoriality principle. Nowhere in the decisions of the Court does it define
"direct legislation;" rather, it offers only case-specific functional definitions of
when legislation directly regulates conduct beyond a state's borders. Such an ad
hoc approach tends to contribute little to the development of a consistent body of
legal principles. In fact, it serves merely to confound both the federal judiciary
and state legislatures.200
Furthermore, the Court's language suggests that the discarded direct-indirect
test of the first half of the twentieth century is creeping back into the analysis. The
problems with such a test, discussed above, were several. The direct-indirect dis-
tinction was cast aside for being too abstract and for contributing little to an other-
wise difficult task of determining how far state regulations may go before they run
afoul of the Constitution. 20 1 The Court's insistence on applying such a formal
distinction does not bode well for future state legislation, especially the pioneering
state legislation needed to respond to the ever-changing economy.
2. Extraterritoriality in the Lower Federal Courts: Confusion and Uncertainty
Relying on the Court's "guidance" from cases such as Brown-Forman and
Healy, the lower federal courts have employed the extraterritoriality principle as a
197. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
198. E.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 336-37.
199. See supra text accompanying note 181 for the Healy principles.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 127-32.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
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means to strike down state legislation that extends beyond the boundary of the
enacting state. The courts have, however, struggled to ascertain just where, if at
all, the principle fits into the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Specifi-
cally, the lower federal courts have had considerable difficulty defining the appro-
priate level of scrutiny to apply, defining the scope of the Court's ban on statutes
giving rise to conflicting obligations between states, and determining when a stat-
ute has effects "wholly outside" the enacting state's borders in cases implicating
the doctrine. Essentially, the lower federal courts, following the lead of the Su-
preme Court, have utilized the extraterritoriality principle without comprehending
exactly what the principle is and without any clear understanding of how to define
it. This section will demonstrate the problems that the circuits and several district
courts have had in this regard and will attempt to garner support for the assertion
that such problems have resulted in unpredictable legal standards and inconsistent
decisions.
a. Defining the Appropriate Level of Scrutiny
Because the level of scrutiny applied to a particular statute may very well
determine its constitutionality, applying the appropriate level of scrutiny is essen-
tial in the dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The circuit courts have had diffi-
culty in construing the principles laid out in Healy with respect to defining the
appropriate level of scrutiny to be used for statutes that implicate the extraterrito-
riality principle. For example, in National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v.
Meyer,202 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered a Wisconsin statute
that conditioned the use of Wisconsin landfills by cities, counties, or states (whether
or not they were located within Wisconsin) on their compliance with Wisconsin
recycling standards. 203 Relying heavily on the extraterritoriality principle, the
Seventh Circuit invalidated the Wisconsin statute on Commerce Clause grounds.204
Stating that "the Wisconsin statute seeks to force Wisconsin's judgment with re-
spect to solid waste recycling on communities in its sister states 'at the pain of an
absolute ban on the flow of interstate commerce,"' the court found the statute to be
an impermissible direct regulation of interstate commerce. 205 As a result, the court
applied the near-fatal rule of per se invalidity.2 06 More importantly, the court
noted that because the practical effect of the statute was to regulate extraterritori-
ally, the statute could also be viewed as impermissibly discriminating against in-
terstate commerce.20 7 Thus, the court did not treat separately the question of
whether the statute had "extraterritorial reach" from the question of whether that
statute discriminated against interstate commerce. 20 8 Although the court stated
202. 63 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1995).
203. Id. at 658.
204. Id. at 659. The court stated that "the Commerce Clause constrains a state from project-
ing its economic legislation onto commerce wholly occurring in its sister states." Id. The court
further implied that merely affecting commerce beyond a state's borders is sufficient to invali-
date the statute as a direct regulation of interstate commerce. Id. at 659-60.
205. Id. at 660-61 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 524 (1935)).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 661 ("Although we have characterized the Wisconsin statute as impermissibly
regulating directly interstate commerce, we note that the practical effect of the statute could also
be analyzed as working a discrimination on interstate commerce.").
208. See id. at 662.
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that it did not need to decide whether the two questions should be analyzed dis-
tinctly from one another, it did so nonetheless by noting that the extraterritorial
effect of the Wisconsin statute was sufficient to invalidate the statute under the
heightened, but not per se invalid, level of scrutiny for discriminatory state regula-
tions.209 Analyzing the Wisconsin statute in this manner, the Seventh Circuit held
that the regulation failed to pass muster under the "heightened level of scrutiny"
where a state must demonstrate that no other less discriminatory alternatives were
available to the state legislature.2 10 In so holding, the Seventh Circuit essentially
infused the extraterritoriality principle into the test for state statutes that discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce in effect. 2 11 The court thus effectively substi-
tuted the question of whether the statute impermissibly extended beyond the Wis-
consin border for the traditional protectionist purpose analysis.
Comparing Meyer with Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams,2 12 the circuits apparently
differ in their approach of defining the appropriate level of scrutiny applicable in
cases implicating the extraterritoriality principle. In Cotto Waxo, the Eighth Cir-
cuit considered a Minnesota regulation prohibiting the sale of petroleum-based"sweeping compounds" within the State of Minnesota. 2 13 Plaintiff-appellant Cotto
Waxo Co. filed suit in order to challenge the statute on the grounds that, inter alia,
it violated the Commerce Clause. 2 14 Cotto Waxo Co. argued that the statute effec-
tively destroyed the company's market for petroleum-based sweeping compounds
in the Midwest.2 15 Specifically, it argued that the Minnesota statute exerted extra-
territorial reach by affecting conduct occurring wholly out-of-state. 2 16
In determining which level of scrutiny to apply to the Minnesota regulation,
the court conspicuously noted that regulations effecting extraterritorial reach are
treated separately and apart from those raising questions of discrimination against
interstate commerce. 2 17 The Eighth Circuit clarified that for statutes effecting
extraterritorial reach, a rule of per se invalidity would attach.2 18 In contrast, it
209. Id.
210. Id. at 661-62. The court found that the State of Wisconsin failed in this regard: "Wis-
consin could realize its goals of conserving landfill space and protecting the environment by
mandating that all waste entering the State first be treated at a materials recovery facility with
the capacity to effect this separation." Id. at 662.
211. See Eric Anthony Braun, Note, National Solid Wastes Management Association v. Meyer:
The Dormant Commerce Clause Claims Another Environmental Victim, 11 J. NAT. RESOURCES &
ENVTL. L. 135, 144-46 (1996).
212. 46 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1995).
213. Id. at 792.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 793.
217. Id. Cf. Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001) (treating sepa-
rately the question of whether a state law impermissibly regulated conduct beyond the enacting
state's borders from the question of whether the statute created an actual conflict between the
regulatory regimes in other states).
218. Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d at 793 ("A state regulation is per se invalid when it
... has the practical effect of controlling conduct beyond the boundaries of the state."); see also
Automated Salvage Transp., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Envtl. Sys., Inc., 155 F.3d 59, 77 (2d. Cir.
1998) (noting that the appropriate standard in extraterritoriality cases is the "invalid per se"
standard of review); Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 35 F3d 813, 824
(3rd Cir. 1994) (employing per se standard); Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 616 (7th
Cir. 1999) (employing the per se standard).
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noted that statutes discriminating against interstate commerce "either on its face or
in practical effect" are subject to strict scrutiny.2 19 The court further observed
that, under strict scrutiny, the statute could survive only if the state is able to dem-
onstrate that the regulation serves a legitimate local purpose that: (a) is not related
to economic protectionism; and (b) could not be adequately served by other, less
discriminatory measures.220 Finding that the extraterritoriality doctrine arises where
a state regulation "requires out-of-state commerce to be conducted according to
in-state terms," the Eighth Circuit held that the Minnesota regulation did not im-
plicate the extraterritoriality doctrine. 22 1 Judge Beam remarked that although the
statute had undeniably affected Cotto Waxo's business, it was not per se invalid
because of its "indiffer[ence] to sales occurring out-of-state. '222 Moreover, the
court found that the Minnesota statute did not rise to the level required for invali-
dation under strict scrutiny.22 3 Finding that the statute prohibited the sale of sweep-
ing compounds without regard to the product's origin, the court determined that
the statute did not favor in-state business. 224 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit held
not only that the statute did not directly regulate interstate commerce, but also that
a strict scrutiny analysis was not applicable. 225
Considering the Wisconsin statute in Meyer alongside the Minnesota statute
in Cotto Waxo, the problem in applying the appropriate level of scrutiny stands in
stark relief. The statute at issue in Meyer was arguably less restrictive than the one
considered in Cotto Waxo. Whereas the Minnesota statute precluded the sale of
petroleum sweeping compounds within the State of Minnesota, the Wisconsin statute
merely conditioned the use of the state landfills on compliance with the regulatory
framework. Despite this important distinction, the Seventh Circuit invalidated the
statute on extraterritoriality grounds. The approach taken by the Seventh Circuit
in Meyer is rather problematic for at least two reasons. First, the decision in Meyer
provides very little guidance to the legal community as to where the extraterritori-
ality principle fits into the dormant Commerce Clause framework. The opinion
hopelessly intertwined the standard used for per se statutory violations with that
used for discriminatory legislation. After reading the decision, judges and lawyers
alike will likely be unable to grasp, with any level of certainty, how a court will or
should come down in a particular case.
Moreover, the decision seems to extend the principles set forth in the lan-
guage of the Supreme Court opinions by allowing the extraterritoriality principle
to enter into the "discrimination against interstate commerce" analysis. Such an
expansion confuses the protectionism and discrimination issues involved with a
219. Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d at 793.
220. Id. (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)).
221. Id. at 794. See also Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir.
2001) (involving a statute that only prohibited automobile manufacturers from engaging in re-
tail sales in Texas, not in other states); Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 267 F.3d 45, 64 (1st Cir.
2001), withdrawn, rev'd en banc, 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002) (unanimously sustaining a Massa-
chusetts law requiring manufacturers of tobacco products to disclose additional ingredient in-
formation on the ground that it did not force transactions occurring out of state to follow the
labeling requirement).
222. Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d at 794.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. ("[T]he Act does not directly burden interstate commerce and strict scrutiny does not
apply.").
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dormant Commerce Clause analysis with the federalism and sovereignty issues
involved with an extraterritoriality analysis. As one commentator has noted, such
an expansion serves to augment the ability of the judiciary to invalidate state leg-
islation. 226 The discrimination-extraterritoriality distinction drawn by the court in
Cotto Waxo avoids the above problems that the Seventh Circuit will inevitably
face in future cases involving questionable state legislative initiatives.
b. Problems Determining When a Statute Affects Commerce "Wholly Outside"
the Enacting State's Borders
In addition to having considerable difficulty in determining what level of scru-
tiny to apply to statutes implicating traditional extraterritoriality concerns, several
courts have also struggled to resolve the intricate difficulties involved with the
extraterritoriality principle analysis. Perhaps the most difficult portion of the analy-
sis to unravel has been determining when, under the blueprint the Supreme Court
laid down in Healy, a state's law has effects which occur "wholly outside" the
boundaries of the state.227 This inquiry, as observed by several Justices on the
Supreme Court, is more difficult than it first appears. 228 Several circuits have
floundered in their efforts to answer this complex question and have resorted to
more familiar and comfortable methods of analysis as a result.
In Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel,2 29 for example, the Seventh Circuit chose to
rely on traditional contract principles to answer the difficult question of whether a
statute's effects occurred solely outside a state's borders. Dean Foods involved a
challenge by an Illinois milk processing company to a State of Wisconsin law
governing milk prices. 230 The Wisconsin law sought to curtail the Dean Food
Company's payment of "volume premiums" to those producers supplying it with
larger quantities of milk.23 1 Alleging that the Wisconsin ban on volume premiums
regulated transactions occurring in Illinois, Dean Foods Company filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin seeking injunc-
tive relief. 232 The Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture appealed
the District Court's grant of injunctive relief.233
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court that
the Wisconsin law violated the ban on extraterritorial legislation.2 34 Reviewing
de novo the District Court's decision as to where the transactions in commerce
took place, the Seventh Circuit rejected the state's assertion that the numerous
contacts Dean Foods had with Wisconsin farmers supported its argument that some
sales contracts were formed within the borders of Wisconsin. 235 Rather, the court
226. Braun, supra note 211, at 147-48.
227. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989).
228. See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
229. 187 .3d 609 (7th Cir. 1999).
230. Id. at 610.
231. Id. at 611. These "volume premiums" apparently had the effect of favoring those pro-
ducers with large herds of cattle and forcing smaller dairy farms in Wisconsin to go out of
business. Id.
232. Id. at 610-11.
233. Id. at 612.
234. Id. at 620.
235. Id. at 617.
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looked to the Uniform Commercial Code and state common law governing con-
tract formation in an effort to determine whether the parties completed their con-
tract in the State of Wisconsin or elsewhere. 2 36 Concluding that neither a meeting
of the minds nor a binding commitment as to essential terms occurred until the
milk arrived in Illinois, the court determined that the transactions "indisputably
occurred in Illinois, and that no contracts were formed in Wisconsin." 2 37 Finding
that the commercial transactions involved all occurred outside Wisconsin, the court
concluded that the Wisconsin law violated the extraterritoriality principle.2 38
The Seventh Circuit is not alone in utilizing more traditional methods of analysis
to solve the puzzle over when a statute crosses the hazy line into the area of extra-
territorial reach. In Instructional Systems Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp.,2 39
the Third Circuit similarly encountered the question of whether a state regulation
had effects occurring wholly outside New Jersey. The dispute involved the New
Jersey Franchise Practices Act as it pertained to a contract between a computer
learning system producer and a northeastern United States distributor.240 Instruc-
tional Systems, Inc. argued that Computer Curriculum Corporation had violated
the Act, which required franchisors to terminate franchises only for good cause.2 41
Computer Curriculum moved for summary judgment on the grounds that, inter
alia, the Act violated the dormant Commerce Clause due to its application to fran-
chise territory outside of the State of New Jersey.242 The District Court held that
the Act governed the agreement and that it violated the extraterritoriality prin-
ciple.2 43
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's ruling on the extra-
territoriality issue and concluded that the application of the Act to the parties'agree-
ment did not violate the Commerce Clause per se.244 The court reasoned that
traditional contract matters concerning multiple states frequently involve "diffi-
cult choice of law question[s]" where one state's law will apply to a contract gov-
erning out-of-state transactions. 2 45 Extending that rationale to the facts of the
236. Id.; cf. K-S Pharmacies, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 962 F.2d 728, 730-31 (7th Cir.
1992) (resorting to statutory interpretation and reading "most favored purchaser" as "most fa-
vored purchaser in Wisconsin" in order to answer the question as to whether a Wisconsin statute
prohibiting price discrimination in pharmaceutical sales regulated sales outside Wisconsin).
237. Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d at 619.
238. Id. at 620. The court distinguished the facts in Dean Foods from a case where elements
of the deal occurred in separate states. Id. (referencing A.S. Goldmen & Co. v. N.J. Bureau of
Sec., 163 F.3d 780 (3rd Cir. 1999)). In Goldmen, the court seemed to suggest that the result
might be different because both states would have an interest in regulating the terms of the
contract. Id. at 787.
239. 35 F.3d 813 (3rd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1183 (1995).
240. Id. at 816. The parties to the dispute had agreed that Instructional Systems, Inc. (ISI)
would, from 1984 to 1989, be the exclusive distributor of Computer Curriculum Corporation's
(CCC) product in Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington, D.C. Id. By agreement of the parties,
California law would govern any dispute. Id. The fighting issue arose in 1989 when CCC opted
to limit ISI's marketing territory, thereby prompting ISI to sue for injunctive relief. Id.
241. Id. ISI argued that the written agreement for a specific period granting it the right to
market and sell CCC's product constituted a franchise under the Act. Id.
242. Id. at 816-17.
243. Id. at 823.
244. Id. at 826.
245. Id. at 825.
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case, the court determined that, by agreeing to the terms of the exclusive distribu-
tion agreement, the parties chose to have the Act govern their situation. In effect,
under a choice of law analysis the parties themselves had therefore caused the Act
to reach beyond the borders of New Jersey.246 Due to this finding, the Third Cir-
cuit concluded that the instant case was distinguishable from Healy and Brown-
Forman in that those cases involved situations where the state itself "dictated [a
regulation's] extraterritorial effect."' 24 7 However, finding that such cases were
inapposite did not end the inquiry. The court continued to analyze the "'practical
effect"' of the statute; specifically, the court inquired as to the likelihood that the
statute could result in subjecting parties to inconsistent legislation from different
states. 248 On this point, the Third Circuit found that the Act did not raise a consti-
tutional problem for creating a likelihood of inconsistent regulations. 249
A recent case arising in the United States District Court for the District of
Maine, Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Concannon,2 50
reveals the inherent difficulty in determining when a statute regulates transactions
occurring completely out-of-state. For purposes of discussing the extraterritorial-
ity issues raised in the case, it may help to briefly outline the relevant sections of
the challenged statute at issue, which provides for the "Maine Rx Program. '25 1
The State of Maine passed a statute providing for a program designed to pro-
vide affordable prescription drugs to all qualified residents within Maine. Basi-
cally, the statute requires drug manufacturers wishing to sell prescription pharma-
ceuticals in Maine to enter into negotiated rebate agreements with the program
commissioner.252 The rebate amounts are determined by a process of negotiation
in which the state may consider the amounts calculated under the federal Medicaid
program. 253 The amounts received under the rebate program are then used to
reimburse pharmacies that offer prescription drugs to participating state residents
246. Id. The court stated: "[I]t is the parties' own agreement which operated to project the
New Jersey law outside of New Jersey's borders, a result which CCC will find ironic but which
inevitably follows from the choice-of-law analysis." Id.
247. Id. at 826. But see Connecticut v. Crotty, 180 F. Supp. 2d 392 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). Crotty
involved a New York Department of Environmental Conservation emergency regulation restricting
commercial lobstering off Fisher's Island to those individuals who obtained a permit and who
agreed to surrender their right to lobster in the waters of any other state. Id. at 394. Relying
heavily on Healy v. Beer Inst., the District Court granted the injunction on the ground that the
regulation impermissibly regulated extraterritorially by precluding those who lobstered off
Fisher's Island from engaging in the commercial lobstering trade in any other state. Id. at 399-
402. The court's reliance on Healy may have been misplaced. Notably, the lobstermen were
not, under the terms of the regulation, required to obtain a Fisher's Island permit. Rather, they
had the ability to decide for themselves whether to lobster either the waters off Fisher's Island or
the waters of surrounding states. It follows that the State of New York did not necessarily
"dictate" the effect of the regulation and that the statute merely had, at best, an indirect extrater-
ritorial effect.
248. Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d at 826.
249. Id. See also discussion infra text accompanying notes 272-76.
250. 249 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2001), aff'd sub nom. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh,
123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003).
251. 22 M.R.S.A. §§ 2681-98 (Supp. 2002).
252. Id. § 2681.
253. Id. § 2681(4)(A). The State is required to use its "best efforts to obtain an initial rebate
amount equal to or greater than the rebate calculated under the Medicaid program." Id. §
2681 (4)(B).
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at a discounted rate. 254 Notably, the drugs of the manufacturers that do not partici-
pate in the rebate negotiation are subject to "prior authorization" by the state com-
missioner wherein a drug may not be used in the program without administrative
approval.2 55 These statutory provisions prompted Pharmaceutical Research &
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) to file suit in the United States District Court
in the District of Maine against the State of Maine alleging that the statute was
constitutionally invalid on its face. 256 PhRMA argued, inter alia, that the statute
effected a per se violation of the dormant Commerce Clause under the extraterrito-
riality principle. 25 7 Specifically, the plaintiff argued that, by strong-arming or
coercing out-of-state drug manufacturers into participating in the Maine Rx Pro-
gram, the Maine law effectively regulated the transactions between out-of-state
manufacturers and out-of-state drug wholesalers and essentially dictated the prices
at which manufacturers could sell their products.25 8
The First Circuit disagreed with the argument put forth by PhRMA. Rather,
the court determined that, on its face, the statute merely regulated transactions
occurring within the state. In particular, the First Circuit found that the statute
regulated the purchase of prescription drugs triggering the rebates, the rebate ne-
gotiation process, and the prior authorization process-transactions all occurring
within Maine.2 59 The court also noted that the statute neither required manufac-
turers to sell at a particular price nor tied the price of in-state products to out-of-
state prices. 260 Thus, the court found that the statute was not per se invalid for
regulating extraterritorially. 26 1
The United States Supreme Court accepted the drug manufacturer's petition
for certiorari and reveiwed the First Circuit's decision this past term.262 On ap-
254. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 71 (1st Cir. 2001), aff'd
sub nom. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855 (2003). Notably, the
program is, unlike the federal Medicaid statute, open to all state residents regardless of eco-
nomic well-being.
255. 22 M.R.S.A. § 2681(7).
256. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 72.
257. Id. at 81-82. PhRMA also argued that the Maine statute was unconstitutional under both
the Supremacy Clause and the Pike balancing scheme of the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at
73, 80.
258. Id. at 82.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 81-82; accord Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 267 F.3d 45, 64 (1st Cir. 2001),
withdrawn (unanimously concluding that a Massachusetts law requiring cigarette manufactur-
ers to disclose the identity of all ingredients did not regulate extraterritorially on the grounds
that the act did not require out-of-state commerce in tobacco products to be conducted according
to in-state terms); Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 356 (4th Cir. 2002) (sustaining a
Virginia statute authorizing the state to receive in excess of $4 billion arising out of a settlement
agreement between Virginia and several tobacco manufacturers on the grounds that the statute"specifically limit[ed] its applicability to the sale of cigarettes 'within the Commonwealth,' ...
impose[d] a fee only for cigarettes actually sold within the State... [had] no effect on transac-
tions undertaken by out-of-state distributors in other States ... [and did] not insist on price
parity with cigarettes sold outside of the State") (citation omitted).
261. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 82.
262. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. Of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2001), cert.
granted, 122 S. Ct. 2657 (2002). The two questions presented by the drug manufacturer were as
follows:
1. Whether the federal Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., precludes Maine
from limiting Medicaid patients' access to prescription drugs as a means of compel-
ling drug manufacturers to subsidize price discounts [on prescription drugs] for non-
Medicaid populations?
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peal, the United States Supreme Court flatly rejected the nonresident drug
manufacturer's dormant Commerce Clause challenge.26 3 With regard to the argu-
ment that the Maine Rx Program constitutes impermissible extraterritorial legisla-
tion, the Court succinctly reasoned that the statute neither regulates the price of
any out-of-state transaction nor insists that the drug manufacturers sell their prod-
ucts at a set price. 264 The Court likely determined correctly that the program would
not regulate activity occurring completely outside the borders of Maine. The ne-
gotiation process would occur between the state administrator and the manufactur-
ers and the rebate would likely be paid within the state. Furthermore, in a facial
challenge to the program, discerning whether the ostensibly "voluntary" negotia-
tion process would actually remain voluntary or would become coercive is often
difficult. In its perfunctory discussion of the drug manufacturer's dormant Com-
merce Clause challenge, however, the Court unfortunately offered very little guid-
ance to the circuit courts to assist them in their struggle to determine just when a
state regulation has effects completely outside the borders of the enacting state.
The Maine Rx Program was saved both at the First Circuit and at the Supreme
Court by the fact that PhRMA's challenge was facial as opposed to as applied.
However, the program, if instituted, could raise legitimate extraterritorial concerns.
First, as noted by the First Circuit, the program could become an unconstitutional
vehicle for Maine to regulate prices beyond its borders if Maine were to dominate
the negotiation process. 265 Second, the program might create an inevitable ripple
effect within the pharmaceutical industry. The program could not only jeopardize
the sale of certain pharmaceuticals within Maine, but also could increase the like-
lihood that the manufacturers would need to raise their prices in other states due to
the lower priced pharmaceuticals in Maine. This inevitable effect would require a
court to consider whether Maine, by enacting its program, had impermissibly af-
fected conduct outside its borders. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the pro-
gram will likely be followed by other state legislatures. 266 If allowed to proceed,
the Maine Rx Program will effectively provide affordable prescription drugs to a
large segment of Maine citizens. Other states will likely promulgate similar pro-
grams in an effort to combat rising health care costs and promote the health and
well being of their constituents. The inevitable effect of the various state statutes
would be to subject manufacturers of pharmaceuticals to multiple regulatory
schemes that could very well conflict with one another. 267
2. Whether Maine violates the Commerce Clause by requiring an out-of-state manu-
facturer that sells its products to wholesalers outside the state to remit a payment to
the state each time one of the manufacturers' products is subsequently sold by a re-
tailer within the state?
Brief of Petitioner at i, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66 (1st Cir.
2001) (No. 01-188). Oral argument was held on January 22, 2002.
263. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855, 1871 (2003).
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.c.
267. Brief of Petitioner at 35, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66
(1st Cir. 2001) (No. 01-188).
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c. Problems Determining When Regulations Are "Inconsistent"
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has suggested that courts may also invali-
date state legislation that has the effect of creating inconsistencies between the
regulatory regimes of other states. 26 8 Generally, the federal courts will apply a
rule of per se invalidity to a statute that conflicts with regulations enacted by other
states. 269 The rationale typically stated by courts when invalidating statutes creat-
ing the risk of inconsistent regulatory regimes is that they create confusion for
interstate businesses and unnecessarily burden interstate commerce. 270 Some sug-
gest that the underlying rationale for preventing the establishment of conflicting
regulatory regimes is that the compliance costs for multistate businesses can be
prohibitive. 27 1
Under the Healy framework, the lower federal courts need to determine whether
particular state regulations interfere to such a degree that they may be invalidated
under the dormant Commerce Clause. Of importance in this inquiry are the con-
cept of sovereignty and the broad powers of individual states to decide for them-
selves how to manage the affairs of their citizens.27 2 Of equal importance in the
analysis is the question whether the subjects of the regulation "are in their nature
national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation." 273
In determining at what point state regulatory regimes become "inconsistent,"
the Third Circuit has clarified that laws merely creating additional demands over
regulations from other states do not satisfy the definition of "inconsistent" legisla-
tion. 274 Rather, in Instructional Systems, Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp.275
the court noted that to meet such a definition, one must allege that the respective
statutes have more than a mere "difference in approach" or possibly conflicting
schemes. 276 The court suggested that such a violation would occur if another state
"impose[d] demands on [a party] which would require them to violate New Jersey
law or vice versa."'277 Applying that analysis, the court found that because no
other state had imposed any irreconcilable obligations, the New Jersey Franchise
Practices Act at issue could withstand constitutional scrutiny.27 8
268. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336-37 (1989).
269. Id. at 367; accord Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 79 (1st
Cir. 2001); but see Gaylord, supra note 23, at 1116 (suggesting that the burden caused by incon-
sistent regulations should be factored in as a burden within the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. bal-
ancing analysis).
270. E.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,773-74 (1945); Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki,
969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting that "[t]he menace of inconsistent state regula-
tion invites analysis under the Commerce Clause ... because that clause represented the fram-
ers' reaction to overreaching by the individual states that might jeopardize the growth of the
nation-and in particular, the national infrastructure of communications and trade-as a whole").
271. Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
110 YALE L. J. 785, 806-07 (2001).
272. See Regan, supra note 140, at 1909; RICHARDS, supra note 17, at 107-19.
273. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299,319 (1851). See also Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 640 (noting the need for nationally uniform procedures
among the individual members of the National Collegiate Athletic Association).
274. Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d 813, 826 (3rd Cir. 1994)
(stating that "laws which merely create additional, but not irreconcilable, obligations are not
considered to be 'inconsistent"').
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
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The Third Circuit's suggestion that regulations must be in direct conflict to
render them inconsistent appears to have widespread support in other federal
courts. 27 9 Although the federal courts agree for the most part that regulations
must be in direct conflict in order to render them "inconsistent," they nevertheless
have difficulty employing the Healy framework with any consistency in cases in-
volving avant-garde state legislation. 2 80 For example, in American Libraries Ass'n
v. Pataki,2 8 1 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
invalidated a New York statute criminalizing the dissemination of obscene materi-
als to minors over the Internet. 282 In considering the challenged statute, district
court judge Loretta A. Preska observed that the very nature of the "borderless world
of the Internet raises profound questions concerning the relationship among the
several states and the relationship of the federal government to each state, ques-
tions that go to the heart of 'our federalism.'"283 Specifically, the court observed
that the nature of the Internet allows for information to be simultaneously trans-
mitted to every state and every nation worldwide. 284 After noting that the Internet
represents an innovative instrument of interstate commerce, 285 the court proceeded
to invalidate the New York regulation on several grounds. Subjecting the New
York statute to a three-tiered level of review, the court concluded that the regula-
tion: (1) impermissibly regulated extraterritorially; (2) failed to pass muster under
the Pike balancing scheme; and (3) unconstitutionally subjected Internet users to
inconsistent regulations.28 6
Concerning the issue of whether the New York legislation regulated extrater-
ritorially, the court noted that the nature of cyberspace all but precluded states
from regulating the Internet. 287 Perhaps the most interesting portion of Judge
Preska's opinion, however, dealt with the discussion of inconsistent regulations.
On this point, the court stressed that the Internet represents an area requiring "con-
sistent treatment" by "regulation only on a national level... [and that] [riegulation
by any single state can only result in chaos, because at least some states will likely
enact laws subjecting Internet users to conflicting obligations. " 288 Thus, the court
279. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 83 (1st Cir. 2001)
(requiring actual conflict or "price gridlock"); Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104,
112 (2d Cir. 2001) (requiring a "substantial" or "actual" conflict); S.D. Meyers, Inc. v. City &
County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 470-71 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that "mere speculation
about the possibility of conflicting legislation" is insufficient); but see Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n
v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 639 (9th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that a statute could violate the Commerce
Clause's extraterritoriality prong simply due to its "potential interaction or conflict with similar
statutes in other jurisdictions") (emphasis added).
280. E.g., Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)
(rejecting an extraterritorial reach challenge to a California law governing the transmittal of
unsolicited commercial email advertisements despite the presence of an actual conflict between
the California law and a similar Pennsylvania law because the company had failed to show that
it would be forced to comply with both laws at the same time).
281. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
282. Id. at 183-84.
283. Id. at 168 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
284. Id. at 167 ("'Once a provider posts content on the Internet, it is available to all other
Internet users worldwide."') (quoting Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844
(E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)).
285. Id. at 173.
286. Id. at 177, 181.
287. See id. ("New York has deliberately imposed its legislation on the Internet and, by doing
so, projected its law into other states whose citizens use the Net.").
288. Id. at 181.
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suggested that all state regulations concerning Internet use violate the dormant
Commerce Clause because they inescapably subject users to conflicting regula-
tory schemes.28 9
The Pataki decision has come under attack from judges and commentators
alike. 290 Although the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York was likely correct in determining that the statute at issue in Pataki im-
permissibly regulated extraterritorially, 29 1 the court's sweeping rationale renders
any state regulation of the Internet susceptible to invalidation. The California
courts seem to be leading the movement away from the Pataki court's broad sug-
gestion that states may not engage in regulation of the Internet. In Ferguson v.
Friendfinders, Inc.,292 for example, a California district court candidly rejected
the Pataki rationale when considering a California statute governing the transmit-
tal of unsolicited commercial e-mail advertisements to unsuspecting recipients. 293
After finding that the California law did not regulate conduct occurring wholly
outside of California,294 the court suggested that states could regulate the Internet
to a certain degree. 295 The court then clarified that, in addition to only regulating
conduct within the state borders, the California law did not generate an issue over
inconsistency with unsolicited e-mail regulations in other jurisdictions.296 Not-
withstanding the existence of eighteen similar state regulations, Judge Haerle de-
termined that California's ban on unsolicited e-mail did not violate the Constitu-
tion per se.297 In the court's view, even the existence of an actual conflict with a
Pennsylvania statute was not enough to limit California's ability to proscribe e-
mail transmissions not meeting the criteria set out in its statute.29 8 Because the
289. Id. at 169. The court stated: "[T]he Internet is one of those areas of commerce that must
be marked off as a national preserve to protect users from inconsistent legislation that, taken to
its most extreme, could paralyze development of the Internet altogether." Id.; see also ACLU v.
Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999) (adopting the Pataki rationale). But cf. Hatch v.
Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 471-72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (declining to follow the
Pataki rationale that mere usage of the Internet insulates individuals from state regulation).
290. Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 265-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002);
Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 471-72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); see generally Gaylord,
supra note 23 (arguing that courts should move away from the "extreme stance" taken in Pataki).
291. By its very terms, the statute regulated all Internet activity and not just that directed to
or from New York residents. Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 169, 171 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
292. 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
293. Id. at 265-66. The statute required that persons or entities sending unsolicited e-mail
establish a toll-free number and have that number listed in the first line of e-mail text so as to
allow the recipient to notify the sender that he or she no longer wished to receive such material.
It further required the sender to include in the subject line of each e-mail message "ADV:" as the
first four characters or "ADV:ADLT" if the advertisement concerned adult material. Id. at 261.
294. Id. at 264 ("[The statute] does not ... directly regulate commerce occurring wholly
outside the State. It expressly applies only when [unsolicited commercial e-mail] is sent to a
California resident by means of an electronic-mail service provider who has equipment in the
State.").
295. Id. at 265. The court stated: "Initially, we join the other California courts ... by
rejecting Pataki's holding that any State regulation of Internet use violates the dormant Com-
merce Clause." Id. (citations omitted) (second emphasis added).
296. Id. at 266.
297. Id. The court went on to find that the law also passed constitutional scrutiny under the
Pike scheme. Id. at 266-69.
298. Id. at 266. The Pennsylvania statute cited in the case required that the first nine charac-
ters of the subject line of an unsolicited commercial e-mail containing explicit sexual materials
be "ADV ADULT." California's version instead required the subject line to read "ADV:ADLT".
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challenger of the statute could not show that there would ever be a situation where
a sender would be required to comply with both state statutes, the court deter-
mined that the California statute did not create a risk of inconsistent regulations. 299
Thus, the court suggests that despite the vast borderless world of the Internet, states
can nevertheless enact legislation regarding the Internet without subjecting users
to a chaotic regulatory environment.
The above examination reveals that the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts use the extraterritoriality principle as a way in which to check the regulatory
powers of the states 300 However, the federal courts struggle to define and use the
principle. The Meyer opinion reveals the problems that may arise when the Su-
preme Court does not adequately define the terminology it uses in its opinions.
There, the Seventh Circuit hopelessly confused the levels of scrutiny in trying to
incorporate the extraterritoriality principle into the dormant Commerce Clause
framework. 30 1 Additionally, several lower federal courts have struggled, in the
absence of a clear mandate from the Court, to determine whether or not extraterri-
torial legislation is a particularized form of direct regulation. 302 At least one court
has even gone so far as to assert that the Supreme Court did away with the "direct
regulation" inquiry with two 1994 decisions. 30 3 Although the courts have mainly
utilized the extraterritoriality doctrine separate and apart from the discriminatory
purpose and excessive burden tests, they have unfortunately failed to clearly ar-
ticulate what the principle is and where it fits into the modern dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. 304 Because the courts have been unable to decipher the
broad, yet cryptic language set forth in the line of cases extending from MITE to
Healy, they have developed a patchwork approach to dealing with the problem of
restraining extraterritorial state legislation. In this regard, courts have not only
applied dissimilar levels of scrutiny to legislation having extraterritorial effects,
but also resolved the questions involved with the extraterritorial analysis by vary-
ing means. The inevitable result of such a patchwork approach is that states can-
not be certain whether their planned legislation will survive constitutional scru-
tiny.
III. DISCUSSION
Without question, the federal courts have struggled in following the Supreme
Court's directive to invalidate state legislation with extraterritorial effects. As the
previous Part of this Comment reveals, the courts have had considerable difficulty
doing so because they are unable to conceptualize the extraterritoriality principle
and determine how it fits within the dormant Commerce Clause framework. Con-
sequently, the decisions within the various federal courts lack consistency and fail
to provide a useful framework for dealing with state legislation having extraterri-
torial effects. In fact, courts have invalidated state statutes on extraterritorial reach
299. Id.
300. See Gergen, supra note 63, at 1735.
301. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
302. See, e.g., Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790, 793 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995) (remarking
that the Supreme Court has not clarified the question of whether extraterritorial reach is a "spe-
cial example" of directly regulating interstate commerce).
303. Grant's Dairy-Maine, LLC v. Comm'r, 232 F.3d 8, 19 (1st Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
304. See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 271, at 789 (quoting Regan, supra note 140, at
1884).
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grounds where the state does not impose its legislation on those outside its borders
but merely requires compliance with the terms of its legislation once the choice is
made to enter into a particular transaction. 305 In this sense, the federal courts have
invalidated state initiatives on extraterritorial reach grounds where the state has
not projected its legislation into neighboring states.
Unfortunately, the risks involved with invalidating state legislation on uncer-
tain grounds are considerable. Decisions that haphazardly invalidate state initia-
tives offer legislators little guidance on how to defend their legislation and thus
provide little incentive for states to launch new programs designed to respond to
the changing needs of their citizens. 306 In this regard, Justice Louis Brandeis once
stated:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This
Court has the power to prevent [such] an experiment.... But, in the exercise of
this high power, we must be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into
legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds
be bold. 307
Moreover, when courts decide cases based upon uncertain grounds, there exists a
risk that individual cases will turn in large part upon the "personal value judg-
ments and prejudices of the [presiding] judge. ' '308 This phenomenon calls into
question the "institutional integrity" of the court and opens the ensuing decision to
criticism from those believing that the courts should not be in the business of mak-
ing substantive policy decisions. 309
Due to these significant concerns, the federal courts must have a clear under-
standing of what the extraterritoriality principle is and how best to employ it. Pro-
ceeding in two sections, this Part attempts to shed light on the extraterritoriality
principle. The first section discusses the problems inherent with the approach the
federal courts have taken in deciding cases implicating the extraterritoriality prin-
ciple. It stresses the problems associated with marrying the extraterritoriality prin-
ciple to an ailing dormant Commerce Clause as well as the changing face of our
economy and the growing need to rethink how we are to deal with extraterritorial
issues in the coming years. The next section examines the extraterritoriality prin-
ciple in light of the case discussions in Part II. It attempts to come up with a
workable and limited definition of the principle in order to assist with the discus-
sion of the development of a new approach to dealing with extraterritorial state
legislation.
305. E.g., Connecticut v. Crotty, 180 F. Supp. 2d 392 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
306. See Lawrence, supra note 40, at 398.
307. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
308. See, e.g., HENNESSEY, supra note 128, at 55 (discussing not only the role of the judiciary
in making policy judgments, but also the problems involved with a nonmajoritarian branch of
government making such decisions).
309. Id.; see also Eule, supra note 3, at 442 n.89 (stating that "the choice between competing
substantive political vales must be made by representatives of the people rather than by unelected
judges").
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A. What Are We Doing? The Argument for Separation
There are several problems with the approach of the federal courts of haphaz-
ardly invalidating state initiatives under the dormant Commerce Clause. To begin
with, the dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence has been the subject of count-
less attacks from critics emphasizing that the jurisprudence is merely a judicial
creation without textual justification, 30 10 that determining the appropriate level of
scrutiny is nearly impossible, 31 1 and that the heavy reliance on balancing leads to
inconsistent results and unpredictability. 3 12 Despite the obscurity encompassing
the dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has suggested that the federal
courts should integrate the extraterritoriality principle into the dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. 313 Specifically, the Court has asked the federal courts to analyze
extraterritoriality issues under the per se invalid category initially created to deal
with discriminatory or protectionist state legislation. 3 14
With the benefit of hindsight, we are in a position to recognize the inherent
problems with the Court's suggestion. As discussed above in Part II.C, utilizing
the extraterritoriality principle under the rubric of the dormant Commerce Clause
has confounded the federal judiciary. The difficulties defining the appropriate
level of scrutiny, determining when legislation reaches "wholly outside" the state,
and identifying when regulations may be "inconsistent" have played themselves
out in the federal courts.3 15 Marrying the extraterritoriality principle to an already
besieged dormant Commerce Clause not only expands an ailing body of jurispru-
dence, but also subjects state initiatives that reach beyond a state's borders to a
constitutional doctrine that rests on an unstable legal foundation.
Embedding the extraterritoriality principle within the dormant Commerce
Clause framework poses additional problems as well. First, applying the dormant
Commerce Clause's per se invalid level of scrutiny to extraterritorial state legisla-
tion generates a significant risk that novel state legislation will be invalidated.3 16
Invalidating state initiatives before affording the enacting state the opportunity to
demonstrate that the means chosen are the least burdensome means available runs
the risk of striking down too much legislation.
An even greater reason for separating the extraterritoriality principle from the
dormant Commerce Clause inquiry is that the modes of commerce have changed
since the time the Supreme Court devised the framework for dealing with legisla-
310. See generally, Redish & Nugent, supra note 37.
311. Maltz, supra note 34, at 53-58.
312. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (addressing problems with balancing).
313. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989) ("[T]he 'Commerce Clause...
precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the
State's borders."').
314. Id. at 337 n.14 (citing Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476
U.S. 573, 579 (1986), for the proposition that extraterritorial state legislation, as a direct regula-
tion of commerce, should be "struck down.., without further inquiry").
315. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.c.
316. Cf. O'Grady, supra note 63, at 627-29 (arguing that the per se invalid category should be
narrowed to include only protectionist measures on the grounds that a "more focused per se
constraint" allows a state to exercise its own judgment, affords deference to the state judgments,
and encourages state experimentation). Although Professor O'Grady limited her discussion to
the distinction between discriminatory and protectionist state legislation, her conclusion that the
Court should "focus" the dormant Commerce Clause analysis is consistent with the central argu-
ment in this Comment.
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tion having an extraterritorial effect.3 17 Today, companies make a remarkable
number of interstate sales by way of the Internet. Online banking, investing, and
electronic contract formation have become prevalent and can be expected to be-
come even more so in the coming years. 3 18 With the expansion of the Internet and
a proliferation in cyberspace traffic, there exists a great need to ensure the protec-
tion of cyberspace users. 3 19 Moreover, in the health care field, states have been
looking for new ways in which to alleviate the substantial cost and access concerns
since the early 1990s. 320 If the Maine RX Program is any indication of the solu-
tions that we may expect from states to these problems, individual states will likely
make an effort to enact programs similar to the one that survived constitutional
scrutiny in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and the United
States Supreme Court. 32 1
In short, states will likely endeavor to experiment with techniques that assist
them in their efforts to wrestle with the changing needs of their citizens. Due to
the nature of the recent changes in the modes of commerce, however, legislative
experiments can be expected, which will involve legislation with effects that can
be felt beyond the borders of the enacting state.322 These changes call into ques-
tion the Court's suggested approach of dealing with extraterritorial state legisla-
tion under the labyrinthine dormant Commerce Clause framework. More impor-
tantly, these changes require a rethinking both of our notions of federalism and of
our concerns with extraterritorial state legislation. Part III.B will attempt to do
just that.
Some argue that the extraterritoriality principle is not a dormant Commerce
Clause problem. In his often-cited article, Professor Donald Regan323 asserts that
the extraterritoriality principle is not contained within the Commerce Clause.3 24
He bases such a broad assertion on the fact that instances exist in which the extra-
317. See, e.g., Gaylord, supra note 23, at 1097-98 (observing that the expansion of cyberspace
has greatly increased the likelihood that state regulations concerning the internet will reach
beyond the borders of the enacting state).
318. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 14.01 (1997) (comment-
ing on the emergence of a new commercial environment in which commerce is conducted).
319. E.g., Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 183 (S.D.N.Y 1997) (suggesting
the need of national regulation of website content to avoid exposing unsuspecting individuals to
indecent materials). See also NIMMER, supra note 318, at 14.02 (observing that electronic
environments capable of "more rapid processing" raise the "susceptibility to different types of
fraud and errors" than were present under "manual environments").
320. E.g., Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation and Federalism: Legal Impediments to State Health
Care Reform, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 121, 121 (1993).
321. Cf Rachel Regenold, Tobacco Litigation: Manufacturers Required to Disclose Ingredi-
ents Under State Disclosure Law-Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 493, 494
(2001) (discussing the First Circuit's decision in Phillip Morris v. Reilly and observing that the
likely fallout from the decision will be that other states will "follow Massachusetts' lead and
pass similar disclosure acts in order to protect the public health").
322. See Garcia v. San Antontio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (noting that "technology [has] converted every local problem into a national one").
323. William W. Bishop Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
324. Regan, supra note 140, at 1873.
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territoriality principle is implicated, but that do not involve the flow of commerce. 325
Although his example may be correct, it does not assist the reader in understand-
ing why the extraterritoriality principle is not embedded within the dormant Com-
merce Clause. Rather, his example provides only one hypothetical case and thus
offers very little in the way of support for his ultimate assertion. Comparing the
underlying concerns of the dormant Commerce Clause and the extraterritoriality
principle may make a more convincing argument.
As discussed in Part II above, the dormant Commerce Clause is concerned
with the process of state legislation as well as with statutes that either discriminate
against interstate commerce or protect in-state interests.326 Indeed, our Constitu-
tion was drafted in part to evade the economic Balkanization and tariff wars expe-
rienced by the colonies and the states under the Articles of Confederation. 327 Al-
though states have not gone so far as to enact tariffs since the Constitution took
effect, they have established other measures creating economic barriers against
competition so as to "reap ... the benefits of tariffs by other means."'32 8 State
initiatives that create economic barriers to competition serve merely to impede the
free flow of commerce and impose a substantial burden on the national economy.329
Such measures conflict with the Framers' "intention of preventing states from iso-
lating themselves and destroying all hope of national unity."330 In light of the
above concerns, the Commerce Clause ensures that an area of free trade exists in
which the several states may operate.33 1
On the other hand, the extraterritoriality principle is not concerned with dis-
crimination, protectionism, or with the process of state legislation. 332 Rather, the
Court's current interpretation of the extraterritoriality principle is concerned with
limiting the number of state regulatory regimes to which an individual or corpo-
325. Id. at 1888. The example Professor Regan offers bears repeating:
Now, imagine that Georgia adopts a law expressly forbidding acts of homosexual
sodomy committed by any person anywhere in the United States. An Illinois citizen,
traveling in Georgia, is arrested and prosecuted by Georgia authorities for a recent act
of homosexual sodomy that occurred in Illinois. The Illinois traveler objects that
Georgia cannot do this. And, of course, he is right. The Georgia law is a classic
example of extraterritorial legislation, and it is forbidden by the Constitution.
The unconstitutionality of the Georgia law has nothing to do with the commerce
clause. No commerce is involved.
Id.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
328. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1994) (noting that tariffs are"so patently unconstitutional that our cases reveal not a single attempt by any State to enact
one").
329. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 ("Restrictions so contrived are an
unreasonable clog upon the mobility of commerce. They set up what is equivalent to a rampart
of customs duties designed to neutralize advantages belonging to the place of origin.").
330. O'Grady, supra note 63, at 627.
331. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 470 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
"'the very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among the several
States... [and the Clause] by its own force created an area of trade free from interference by the
States"') (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 402-03 (1984)). See also
NOWAK ET AL., supra note 18, at 145-46 (arguing that the Commerce Clause was designed to
ensure a national power "broad enough to deal with the type of economic problems of the nation
as a unit").
332. TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1079-80 (noting that protectionist and extraterritorial legisla-
tion are very different); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 409 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that
the theme of political representation is inapposite to the extraterritoriality analysis).
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rate entity will be subjected. 333 In cases involving extraterritorial state legislation,
the Court further focuses on the authority of an individual state to enact substan-
tive legislation.3 34 In this sense, the principle has been compared with the ability
of a state to assert jurisdiction over individuals outside its borders. 335 In fact, the
similarities between the ability of a state to assert jurisdiction over and pass legis-
lation concerning individuals beyond its borders have thus raised the question of
whether the extraterritoriality principle should be located within the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 336 However, such an argument appears to
miss the mark. The Due Process Clause serves as a limitation on state action vis-
A-vis individuals 337 and says nothing concerning any limitation on the actions of a
state vis-A-vis other states. 338
The elements of state sovereignty and federalism also run deep within the
current formulation of the extraterritoriality principle. 339 According to the Su-
preme Court, "a statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside
the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State's author-
ity.' '340 This statement implies that distinct spheres of power exist in which states
may operate and that each state retains full authority within its respective sphere. 34 1
However, in light of the fact that our nation is comprised of fifty-one individual
sovereign governments, 342 if one state legislates so as to exceed its sphere it runs
the risk of interfering with the authority of another state properly operating within
its own sphere. The extraterritoriality principle serves to manage this delicate
333. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989).
334. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (noting that the Court will strike down
state laws having the "'practical effect of... [controlling conduct] beyond the boundaries of the
state"') (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945)).
335. Id. (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977), a case holding, on due process
grounds, that a state may not maintain in rem jurisdiction unless individuals have sufficient"minimum contacts" with the state). Notably, the statement comparing the two did not com-
mand a majority of the Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp.
336. E.g., Regan, supra note 140, at 1890-92 (considering such a question).
337. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states: "[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . Id.
(emphasis added).
338. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 140, at 1891-92 (arriving at the same conclusion).
339. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 337.
340. Id. at 336 (emphasis added).
341. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,458 (1991) (noting that states have broad powers
within their respective spheres to govern "'the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State"') (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45,
at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). That the states possess broad powers
can be further inferred from the Tenth Amendment, which states that "[t]he powers not del-
egated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The limitations on state
sovereign powers can be found in Article I, section 10, clauses 1-3.
342. The fifty-one sovereign governments are comprised of the government of the individual
fifty states as well as the national government. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at 457 (ob-
serving that the "Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and
the Federal Government" and that the several "States possess sovereignty concurrent with that
of the Federal Government") (internal citations omitted).
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balance of power between the states. 343 The principle ensures that a state will not
overstep its bounds and unreasonably trample upon the authority of another sover-
eign.344 Comparing these concerns with those underlying the federal courts' dis-
dain for discriminatory or protectionist state legislation illustrates that they are
distinct and are thus deserving of singular treatment.
B. A New Approach: Arriving at a Workable Framework for Evaluating
Extraterritorial State Legislation
Unfortunately, the line determining when a state has overstepped its bounds
by legislating extraterritorially is not clear.345 The problems that the federal courts
have had in employing the principle are merely a testament to the blurred con-
straints on states to affect those beyond their borders. What is clear is that, to a
certain extent, states may enact legislation having extraterritorial effects. 34 6 In
order to ensure both that states act within their respective spheres and that novel
state initiatives are not undeservedly invalidated, arriving at a paradigm for the
extraterritoriality principle that is clear and that allows for some extraterritorial
reach by states is essential. This section attempts to devise such a framework.
Defining the extraterritoriality principle is challenging. One commentator
has defined the principle as follows: "For the most part, states may not legislate
extraterritorially, whatever exactly that means."' 34 7 That definition suggests the
inherent difficulties with constructing a coherent and workable framework for ana-
lyzing state regulations having effects outside a state. It suggests not only that
states may legislate such that the effects of its legislation are felt outside the state,
but also that the line distinguishing acceptable and objectionable state initiatives is
343. The Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, also plays an important role in
ensuring this balance in some cases involving the applicability of state legislation in other states.
That Clause states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. It thus requires that,
provided state X had jurisdiction to enact a law or enter a judgment, state Y must be prepared to
honor the law or judgment of state X. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 975 (1998). Some
have stated that the Full Faith and Credit Clause expresses the principle that the rights and
obligations created in each state are afforded the maximum level of enforcement by sister states.
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 615 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In this respect, the
concern of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is somewhat different from the concerns of the
extraterritoriality principle. Specifically, the extraterritoriality principle is distinct because it
"forbids a state from acting on its own laws when it should not" and does not concern itself with
the issue of ensuring that a state's laws are honored by sister states. Regan, supra note 140, at
1894 (emphasis added).
344. See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 337; TRIBE, supra note 138, at 1078 n.21).
345. Regan, supra note 140, at 1896; Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 271, at 789.
346. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92-93 (1987) (suggesting that a state
may legislate extraterritorially to a certain extent); Regan, supra note 140, at 1896; see also
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 345 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing for a less expan-
sive extraterritoriality doctrine on the grounds that a broad prohibition against extraterritorial
state legislation would invalidate too many state initiatives).
347. Regan, supra note 140, at 1896.
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often blurred. Vague as the definition is, there appears to be some general agree-
ment with it.348
Unfortunately, a workable and dependable framework cannot end there. Even
Professor Regan, the author of the above definition, recognized this reality. Regan
qualified his definition of the extraterritoriality principle by including a formalis-
tic distinction: states may legislate extraterritorially and indirectly affect conduct
occurring beyond their borders so long as they do not directly regulate out-of-state
behavior.349 Again, Professor Regan provides a single hypothetical in support of
his belief that a framework grounded in formalism is the means by which the courts
should evaluate extraterritorial legislation. Such a mechanical approach lacks the
degree of clarity necessary in order to provide state legislatures guidance and in-
centive to experiment. The approach also fails to appreciate the difficulties in
distinguishing between direct and indirect action, especially in situations involv-
ing complicated interstate transactions. 350 Further, it not only generates a risk that
valid state initiatives will be swept away by the judiciary, but also increases the
possibility that arbitrary decisions will result.35 1 In short, a framework resting on
a formalistic distinction between direct and indirect activity falls short of striking
the delicate balance between ensuring both that states do not exceed their legisla-
tive authority and that novel state initiatives will not be needlessly invalidated. 352
Alternative schemes exist that reject such a mechanical approach to dealing
with the extraterritoriality principle. Directly responding to Regan's article on the
extraterritoriality principle, Professor Gergen35 3 similarly recognized the prob-
lems associated with states reaching beyond their respective spheres. 354 Noting
that Regan's scheme "does not seriously restrain the states" in that the "ends a
state might wish to accomplish by directly regulating foreign behavior usually can
be met by indirect legislation," Professor Gergen eschews formalism for a balanc-
ing approach. 3 55 Arguing that the "hard cases" to which Regan referred may be
more prevalent than suggested, he instead selected a framework that would afford
348. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. at 92-93 (suggesting that a state may
legislate extraterritorially to a certain extent). See also Gergen, supra note 63, at 1735-37 (sug-
gesting that Professor Regan's basic definition is difficult to argue with, but expressing his clear
disdain for Regan's additional comment that the principle must be further qualified by including
a formalistic ban on direct regulation of behavior beyond a state's borders); Gaylord, supra note
23, at 1123-27 (implicitly supporting Regan's basic definition).
349. See Regan, supra note 140, at 1899-900. Professor Regan clarifies this distinction with
a hypothetical: Michigan can prohibit smoking within the state of Michigan regardless of the
effects on the cigarette industry, but may not prohibit cigarette manufacturing in North Carolina.
350. E.g., Gergen, supra note 63, at 1738-39.
351. Id.
352. Professor Regan does not disregard the problems with a formalistic approach. Regan,
supra note 140, at 1879. He realizes that difficult cases will arise that challenge his framework.
He argues, however, that "[in the end, some hard cases must simply be decided by judicial
intuitions concerning the spirit of the Constitution." Id. The problems that arise from a heavy
reliance on "judicial intuitions" were discussed in the introductory paragraphs to this Part. See
supra text accompanying notes 305-09.
353. Joseph C. Hutcheson Professor, University of Texas School of Law.
354. Gergen, supra note 63, at 1738.
355. Id. at 1737-42.
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the state some deference while allowing the court to balance the costs and the
benefits of the enacted legislation. 356
The weakness with Gergen's proposal comes sharply into focus upon close
analysis. Gergen suggests that the courts should defer to the legislative product,
yet turns around and states, within the very same paragraph, that "though a law
seems a product of no ill will [by the state], the Court should not be reluctant to
strike it down if it seems the costs greatly outweigh the benefits."'357 The weigh-
ing of legitimate competing interests is best left to the state legislatures. Many
have argued that the courts are ill suited to engage in such activities. 35 8 Professor
Eule's statement concerning judicial intervention bears repeating:
The failure to defer to the legislative product undercuts the democratic process in
a multitude of ways. It permits substitution of judicially imposed polices for
evenhanded and rationally based state legislative efforts. It encourages politi-
cally influential interest groups to seek remedies in judicial rather than legisla-
tive tribunals. It induces congressional and agency abrogation of responsibility.
Finally, it subverts the silently expressed will of the majority . . . despite [the
legislature's] considered refusal or inability to achieve legislatively the same re-
sult. 35 9
Therefore, even with the qualification that the courts should adhere as closely as
possible to precedent when they balance, Professor Gergen's proposal similarly
falls short of establishing an appropriate framework for coping with the issues
concerning extraterritorial state legislation.
The schemes for employing the extraterritoriality principle outlined above lack
the necessary deference to the legislative product and the understanding that extra-
territorial state legislation will be more prevalent in years to come. A new ap-
proach is thus needed-one that not only affords considerable deference to state
legislatures, but also appreciates the intergovernmental relationships involved with
extraterritorial state legislation. This subsection briefly suggests a very different
form of analysis for cases implicating the extraterritoriality principle.
First, for the reasons discussed in the various sections of this Comment, the
recommended model frees the extraterritoriality principle from the tangled dor-
mant Commerce Clause web. The recommended model also disregards a formal-
istic approach to evaluating extraterritorial state legislation. As mentioned at sev-
eral points in this Comment, distinctions based on whether a state regulates "di-
rectly" or "indirectly" involve intractable inquiries that the courts are ill suited to
handle. Moreover, formalistic approaches are unforgiving; they generate arbitrary
and unpredictable results and are insensitive to changing circumstances. 360 A for-
mal approach is particularly ill suited to dealing with modem extraterritoriality
cases for this very reason. As the elected representatives of the citizens of a state,
state legislators need the ability to respond to the needs of their constituents as
356. Id. at 1742 (stating that the "major difference" between his proposal and Regan's "is
that rather than saying the Court should never balance, I say that it may sometimes do so").
Fortunately, Gergen qualifies his support of a balancing scheme somewhat. In order to "con-
strain [the court's] discretion," he suggests that the courts should "pay close attention" to and
endeavor not to "vary too far, too fast" from precedent. Id. at 1741-42.
357. Id.
358. See sources cited supra notes 127-28.
359. Eule, supra note 3, at 442-43 (footnote numbers omitted).
360. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting).
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circumstances change. Applying a mechanical test to state initiatives hinders their
ability to meet the wishes of their constituents by gratuitously endangering inven-
tive legislation.
The recommended model also avoids a balancing approach. Weighing the
costs and benefits of particular legislative initiatives is a job that should be left to
those best able to accomplish it.36 1 Courts have neither the available resources
nor the expertise needed to tackle such an endeavor. Moreover, although ad hoc
balancing may tend to produce results more tailored to the individual facts of par-
ticular cases, it fails to contribute to the development of a consistent body of legal
principles. 362 State legislators need predictable legal principles in order to re-
spond appropriately to the needs of their constituents. Prior fact-specific case
holdings oftentimes do little to assist state legislators in their efforts t6 evaluate
proposed solutions to the issues raised by the latest technological advances.
Instead, the suggested framework is marked by considerable deference to the
decisions of state legislatures. It gives the states the ability to enact legislation that
may well extend beyond their borders in certain situations. These situations in-
clude instances where out-of-state parties choose to subject themselves to the law
of the enacting jurisdiction36 3 and where the state has a substantial relationship to
the entities involved. 364 Thus, where an out-of-state individual or entity wishes to
conduct business affecting the lives of the citizens of the enacting state, a state has
a legitimate interest in legislating to ensure that its citizens are treated fairly. Un-
der the suggested scheme, a state would violate the extraterritoriality principle
when it enacted legislation affecting out-of-state parties without any connection to
the state. Such parties are properly within the regulatory jurisdiction of another
sovereign. State legislation that disrupts the delicate balance of federalism and
state sovereignty in this manner should not be afforded the deference enjoyed by
statutes not interfering with these concerns. And, of course, a state would not be
permitted to legislate so as to discriminate against interstate commerce or to favor
in-state interests over out-of-state interests. Such legislation runs afoul of the in-
nate concerns of the dormant Commerce Clause as articulated by the Court in
various opinions. 3 65
361. See sources cited supra note 127.
362. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 1005 (1987) ("But balancing, whatever its merits as a way out of formalism, has itself
become rigid and formulaic. It gives answers, but it fails to persuade.").
363. The case of Instructional Sys., Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 35 F.3d 813, 825-26
(3rd Cir. 1994), provides an apposite example. The case is discussed in detail supra at text
accompanying notes 239-49 & 274-78.
364. The statute at issue in Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), would not fall within either category. Specifically, the statute regulated conduct irre-
spective of a party's choice to subject itself to the regulatory jurisdiction of New York. More-
over, as noted supra at footnote 287, the broad language of the statute essentially reached be-
yond the New York borders to touch all Internet activity and not just that directed to or from
New York residents. Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 171. Cf. generally Gaylord,
supra note 23 (arguing that a "nexus" requirement should determine the outcome of cases in-
volving extraterritorial state legislation of the Internet). The similarity between Gaylord's "nexus
requirement" and substantial connection requirement suggested in this Comment is apparent.
However, the recommended framework, unlike Gaylord's proposal, is not limited to Internet
cases and does not locate itself within the First Amendment. Id. at 1129-30.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 63-69, 79-84, and 94-96.
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The proposed model does not involve the judiciary with intractable inquiries
concerning direct and indirect effects or require that it perform difficult balancing
acts. Rather, the suggested approach limits the role of the courts to inquiring into
whether the legislation is protectionist and whether a sufficient connection exists
between the state and the out-of-state parties. The suggested model therefore lim-
its the discretion of the courts and ensures that states will not legislate for those
who are properly subject to the legislation of another sovereign. In short, the
recommended model suggests a backseat role of the federal judiciary when con-
sidering state legislation having effects beyond the borders of the enacting state.
However, states are not given free reign to enact self-serving legislation that
affects the national economy under the recommended model. 366 Although they
are not significantly hindered in this regard by the federal judiciary, they are lim-
ited nonetheless by the concerns of federalism and by the Supremacy Clause. 367
The onus of supervising the states to ensure that they do not adversely affect the
national commercial interest should be on Congress, not the courts. 368 Congress
is not only better able to recognize when national interests are involved, but also
adequately equipped to protect such interests. 369
IV CONCLUSION
Since the 1980s, the federal courts have relied rather heavily on the extraterri-
torial-reach line of cases to invalidate a variety of state initiatives. Tempted by the
broad and undefined language employed by the Supreme Court in the line of cases
running from MITE to Healy, the courts have invalidated numerous state initia-
tives that reach beyond their state's borders under the Commerce Clause. The
extraterritoriality principle has thus become another powerful weapon in the
judiciary's arsenal to combat state legislation thought to overstep its bounds. Con-
founded by the sweeping language of the Court, the federal judiciary has heed-
lessly struck down state legislation having nominal extraterritorial effects because
it has been unable to conceptualize or adequately constrain the extraterritoriality
principle. In essence, because the federal courts have been unable to ascertain
with any confidence what the extraterritoriality principle is, or how to contain it,
they have struck blindly at state initiatives having effects beyond the borders of the
enacting state. Instead of devising a coherent framework, the federal courts have
created what amounts to a patchwork approach for dealing with extraterritorial
state legislation. In doing so, they have not only offered very little guidance to
state legislatures concerning how to defend initiatives that they have already en-
acted, but also placed in jeopardy the willingness of the states to experiment with
new legislation designed to respond to the changing needs of their citizens. In the
immortal words of Justice Brandeis, such reluctance by states to experiment with
366. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44, (1971) ("[Federalism] does not mean blind
deference to 'States' Rights' any more than it means centralization of control over every impor-
tant issue in our National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected both these courses.").
367. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states, in part: "[t]his Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land .... " Id.
368. Eule, supra note 3, at 483-84.
369. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (noting that the "Federal Government
holds a decided advantage [in checking the abuses of government]: the Supremacy Clause").
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pioneering new initiatives "may be fraught with serious consequences to the na-
tion." 370
The difficulties encountered by the federal judiciary in adjudicating disputes
implicating the extraterritoriality principle are in large part the result of marrying
the extraterritoriality principle to the dormant Commerce Clause. Embedding the
principle within the dormant Commerce Clause framework has augmented the
murkiness of an already besieged body of jurisprudence. Furthermore, such an
approach unjustifiably places state initiatives in jeopardy by subjecting state legis-
lation having extraterritorial effects to several levels of scrutiny, 37 1 thereby in-
creasing the likelihood that the federal courts will determine that the legislation is
unconstitutional. In order to clarify the extraterritoriality cases and to ensure that
state initiatives are afforded appropriate respect, the federal courts should extract
the extraterritoriality principle from the dormant Commerce Clause framework.
Separating the extraterritoriality principle from the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis solves only one half of the problem. The second half of the solution
requires that the courts achieve a greater level of understanding of the extraterrito-
riality principle. The Court has regrettably failed to articulate a workable defini-
tion of the principle. It has further failed to draw a line to distinguish legitimate
from illegitimate extraterritorial state regulations. Such a line must be drawn. We
live in an age of multistate transactions where state boundaries have an ever-in-
creasing significance. 372 Individual transactions may have ripple effects in sev-
eral states; to some degree, such effects are inevitable. Moreover, with the mod-
ernization of our economy and our modes of commerce, the likelihood that states
will need to respond with pioneering legislation is on the rise. 373
This Comment has attempted to sketch a proposal that eliminates many of the
problems inherent within the Court's current framework for dealing with extrater-
ritorial state legislation. It has argued in favor of reducing judicial intrusion into
matters of legislative policy and relied instead on the informed judgment of Con-
gress to resolve issues of the public interest.374 By relying heavily on our very
notions of federalism, the framework suggested in this Comment has endeavored
to reduce the risk that innovative state initiatives will be struck down by the fed-
eral courts. Consequently, it has taken steps to preserve the powers of the state
governments. 375 Chief Justice Marshall's comment in Gibbons v. Ogden that "the
State governments remain, and constitute a most important part of our system"
rings true even today.376 By ensuring that state governments play an active role
370. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
371. E.g., Nat'l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1995).
372. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (noting that "technology [has] converted every local problem into a national one").
373. See Regan, supra note 140, at 1913 (observing that "it is possible to imagine consider-
ably more sympathetic uses of a state power to legislate extraterritorially for its own citizens
than any we have yet discussed").
374. Cf. RICHARDS, supra note 17, at 158. See also Aleinikoff, supra note 362, at 1004
(noting that "[clonstitutional law will have trouble helping to define the arena of politics if it is
seen simply as an act of ordinary politics").
375. See generally Sandra Day O'Connor, On Federalism: Preserving Strong Federal and
State Governments, COURT REVIEW 4-5 (Issue 1 1998).
376. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,199 (1824).
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within our federal system, this Comment has sought, above all, to guarantee the"promise of liberty." 377
Peter C. Felmly
377. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575-76 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (remarking that
the Framers created our unique system of government, comprised of separate national and state
governments, in order to ensure greater freedom by adding an additional layer of political ac-
countability); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458-59 (1991). The Court stated:
Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Fed-
eral Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government
will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.... In the tension between
federal and state power lies the promise of liberty.
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